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Abstract 
Cognitive ability can be measured with several different instruments. The first thing that 
springs to mind is probably IQ or knowledge tests, such as the SAT. In 2005, a new test came 
out on the market, the cognitive reflection test (CRT). This test was constructed differently, 
namely to capture cognitive reflection, an ability to use system 2 in an effective way. System 
2 is a concept from the dual-process theory, which states that our mind is processed with two 
main systems, system 1 and 2. System 1 is always active, and can be described as our intuitive 
system. However, when more difficult tasks need to be dealt with, system 2 needs to be 
activated. It is more complex, and also slower, than system 1. System 2 is deliberate, and thus, 
more often generates proper results, while system 1, sometimes can be sloppy. A high score 
on the CRT is assumed to be related to an active system 2, as the questions are constructed to 
generate an intuitive but incorrect answer. This study aims to examine whether there is a 
difference between an ordinary IQ measure and the CRT. We examine four different 
situations in the field of behavioural economics; decision making between lotteries (with and 
without losses), the public good game and the dictator game. We purpose to clarify and 
summarize the effects, as well as differences in effect, for CR and IQ in general, and fill out 
the gaps where previous research is scarce. This seems to be especially relevant for the 
decision time analysis, seeing that the CRT is a fairly young measure, in contrast to traditional 
IQ measures. Hence, our main focus is to examine the differences in decision times from 
these games, and whether these differences, in turn, are related to better answers and 
outcomes. The results we obtain do confirm that individuals with high CR have a slower 
decision speed for some tasks. It also confirms that these individuals make more rational and 
utility maximizing choices, even more so, than individuals with high IQ. We also found that 
CR can be a better predictor of behaviour in certain situations. Basically, we can confirm that 
there exists a difference between these measures, and thus, that they do capture different 
dimensions of cognitive ability. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Intelligence and cognitive thinking can be interpreted in many different ways, and thus, 
also be measured differently. The first thing that often springs to mind when hearing the word 
intelligence is intelligence quotient (IQ). IQ can be measured with several tests, which are 
often based on logical thinking tasks, made out of illustrations, rather than pure knowledge 
tasks. However, there are various ways to examine cognitive behaviour, and thus, one person 
can be “intelligent” in different ways. Kahneman (2013), among others, discusses that a 
person’s cognitive behaviour consists of two systems, one fast and intuitive (system 1), as 
well as another slow but deliberate system, which is activated in difficult and more 
complicated situations (system 2). Frederick (2005) constructed a test to measure this type of 
cognitive ability, the cognitive reflection test (CRT), which consists of three questions, 
especially designed to encourage an intuitive, but incorrect, answer. This type of test does not 
merely evaluate the logical thinking process, but rather the activeness of system 2. In other 
words, it measures how careful one is when making decisions, which in turn, may lead to 
making better ones. 
According to a larger literature, economic outcomes have shown to be affected by 
cognitive ability, and it is thus interesting for economists to investigate these measures, in 
terms of how, and to what extent, their effect is present in different economic settings. Further 
research in this field is useful to improve understanding of underlying factors that create 
individual differences in decision making and choice theory, in order to successfully 
incorporate this information in economic models (Borghans et al. 2008). One field, among 
others, in which cognitive ability has been widely employed by economists, is the financial 
markets. By investigating if and how cognitive ability affects choices and their outcomes in 
this field, economists have observed, for example, that IQ has a large impact on individuals’ 
participation in financial markets, indicating that a high IQ increases the probability of 
participation. Additionally, it has been observed that, among those who actually do choose to 
participate in the financial markets, a higher IQ is, for instance, associated with having a 
larger stock hold and lower risk (Grinblatt et al. 2011). It has also been found that relatively 
smart investors, measured in IQ, tend to perform better in trading, than relatively “dumb” 
investors (Grinblatt el al. 2012). Further on, IQ has been shown to have an impact on mutual 
fund choice, indicating that individuals with high IQ are less prone to invest in funds with 
high management fees (Grinblatt et al. 2014).  
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Linking this to a more general perspective, it is understandable that information 
concerning cognitive ability in behavioural economics and decision making do have 
implications for economic and financial policies and regulations. Recent literature proposes 
that choices are affected by an individual’s decision-making ability, which is dependent on 
whether or not they have acquired a sufficient level of knowledge that is needed to make 
better choices. Based on this assumption, it further implies that individuals can make choices 
of different decision-making quality, depending on their level of ability (Choi et al. 2014). 
Making choices of different character can influence both individual and aggregate economy. 
For example, if choice quality in fact is related to cognitive ability, which in turn is related to 
education, this could possibly, to some extent, explain phenomena’s such as growing financial 
segregation in societies. If IQ and/or CR is related to making better choices, as well as to 
education, it is likely for individuals with high decision-making ability not only to earn more 
than their counterparts, but also to keep on making better decisions in different financial 
situations (as noted above), and by doing so keep getting ahead in life, whereas the reverse 
relationship then could be assumed for their counterparts. This would then imply that 
inequalities in society could keep on growing, unless accounted for in financial policy and 
regulations. Given that the CRT is a relatively new measure, in comparison to IQ tests, it is 
relevant to examine the relation of CR alone, to different fields of decision making, as well as 
the relation between CR and IQ in these areas, in order to provide further information to this 
literature. 
 One of the essential decisions, when it comes to analysis of cognitive ability, is how you 
choose to measure and define this term, as we mentioned that it can be specified in several 
ways. Since Frederick (2005) introduced the CRT, ten years ago, the measure has gained a 
foothold in this research field. However, still most research only takes into account one 
measure, in reference to cognitive ability, being either cognitive reflection or some other (e.g. 
IQ). Consequently, we have observed only a few studies examining CR in relation to other 
measures of cognitive ability, where the research is especially scarce in contrast to the 
intelligence quotient (IQ), which for long has been viewed as one of the most reliable 
measures of cognitive ability.   
Ergo, in this study we aim to examine the difference between CR and IQ measured 
cognitive ability, when looking at different mechanisms in decision making, such as risk 
taking and money distribution. Our main focus lies on the time spent on these tasks, and thus, 
to examine whether there exists a significant difference between these measures. We do 
believe that this difference exists, because, even though CR and IQ correlate positively, they 
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do not correlate perfectly. Hence, we have incentives to believe that the measures, to some 
extent, capture different aspects of cognitive ability.  
Regarding the general relationship between these measures, prior studies have found that 
low IQ is related to low CR, whereas high IQ is somewhat more or less independent of the 
level of CR (Moritz et al. 2014). Keeping this in mind, we could expect our results to head in 
the same direction, meanwhile, we also need to remember the fact that our vast sample is 
quite deviating from former studies, and we can thus not be too sure of drawing the same 
conclusions.   
Finally, concerning our main analysis we have chosen to focus on the decision speed, with 
the purpose of finding a relation between different response times and different levels of CR. 
If the theory of dual-process systems is truthful, this should be visible in our results. We have 
not yet seen much research that put their main focus on the time spent on various tasks in 
relation to CR. Although, it has been shown that response time, as well as CR and IQ, in 
different extents, correlates with social preferences in different economic games, such as 
public good and dictator games (see sections 2.3 and 2.4). So, in line with the assumption of 
dual-process systems, we hypothesize that individuals with high CR should spend more time 
on making their decisions, than individuals with a lower score, as the former are presumed to 
be more deliberate and thoughtful in their decision making, and thus, may have a more active 
use of their system 2. 
Unlike most studies conducted in this field, our study differentiates regarding the vast 
sample data both in terms of size and variation. A majority of prior studies have been 
examining students, which can cause biases due to lacking variation not only in age, but also 
in other individual characteristics, that can be assumed to be similar in such a narrow sample 
of subjects. As our data is consisting of a large and random sample, with a lot of variation 
among individuals, these kinds of biases should not be as pronounced in this study. 
Using various regressions we examine the relations between cognitive ability, in form of 
CR and IQ, in four different situations; 1) risk aversion decision making, 2) loss aversion 
decision making, 3) public good game, and 4) dictator game. The first two decision making 
gambles are basically a series of choices between two lotteries, both with 50/50 chance 
outcomes. One lottery is considered the safe choice whereas the other is relatively risky. For 
the loss aversion gamble, the lotteries can also include possible losses. The shift point chosen 
in these gambles (i.e. the point in the series where the risky lottery is chosen), says something 
about how efficient individuals are, and we aim to analyse if differences in cognitive ability 
affect this choice. The third and fourth situation involves distributing money. In the public 
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good game, the participants choose to put some amount of money into a common pot, which 
will be doubled and split equally among four participants. The dictator game works between 
two individuals, where the active participant will distribute money between him/her and the 
other participant, without this passive participant having any influence. These situations say 
something about fairness, and of course, we are interested in how cognitive ability affects this 
aspect. However, as mentioned, our primary analysis, concerns the decision times for these 
situations, as we believe that there exists a difference between the two measures, especially 
when examining this part.  
Correspondingly, from our results, it turns out that it does. We do find that an increase in 
CR leads to an increase in decision time, at least for some of the analysed situations. At the 
same time, IQ decreases decision time, implying there to be a difference in these measures. 
CR is supposed to measure how well an individual can make use of their system 2. If a high 
CR, in fact, is related to an active system 2 usage, then our findings are reasonable, as system 
2 is assumed to be slow. We do not find this relation with IQ, because IQ seemingly does not 
capture this specific ability. 
Finally, we observe that high CR individuals do make more efficient decisions, and 
therefore conclude that the extra time spent on making the decision, is worthwhile. However, 
there are studies that show that these results may be spurious, due to biases induced in the 
decision making tests, a matter discussed further in upcoming sections. Additionally, we find 
that cognitive ability, both measured as CR and IQ increases the probability of being selfish in 
the dictator game. We also observe that a high CR decreases the probability of being fair in 
the same game. These results can be related to the fact that intuitive (short decision time) 
individuals are fair in a larger extent than non-intuitive (long decision time) individuals 
(Cappelen et al. 2014), and therefore, a high CR, related to a longer decision time, may 
decrease the probability of being fair for that reason. If this is true, then it might not be 
surprising that we find a high CR to be related to unfairness.   
 
1.1 Limitations 
 We have limited this study to comparing only the cognitive ability measures of CR and 
IQ. This is mainly due to the fact that the database we used (the Internet Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics, i.e. iLEE), had not performed any other tests on the participants at 
the time. If more time was at hand, it would have been particularly interesting to use a newer, 
extended version of the CRT including further questions, for reasons discussed in upcoming 
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sections. Further on, it would have been interesting to examine additional measures of 
cognitive ability, especially further measures of intelligence. 
 
1.2 Disposition 
The remaining part is organized as follows; first we present earlier studies conducted in 
this field and their main results. Second follows a theoretical framework of the key concepts 
from which we have constructed our analysis. Further on we describe the data sample, 
followed by a systematic report of the method that has been used and the results obtained. 
Lastly, we derive a discussion of our own findings, in the context of previous research in the 
field, as well as a discussion of ideas that could be interesting for future researchers. 
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2 Previous research 
 
2.1 Cognitive ability and risk preferences 
As the inventor of the CRT, Frederick (2005) was among the first to study the relationship 
between CR and risk preferences in decision making. In his study, he found that individuals 
who scored high on the CRT, i.e. those with relatively high CR, were more prone to choose 
the risky option, in a gamble between a safe and a relatively risky choice. This result was 
obtained, regardless of the value of the expected gain. The fact that cognitive ability in this 
case was measured with the CRT, tells us that the results might, not entirely, be due to skills 
in calculating expected returns, and thus, not entirely due to mathematical skills, which it 
might have been if it was tested with a test like the SATM
1
 or similar. He further observed that 
this relation does not hold for losses, and concluded that according to his findings, the theory 
of loss aversion (from prospect theory), i.e. that individuals turn from risk seeking when 
facing losses, to risk avert when facing gains, does only apply for individuals with relatively 
low CR. These results have been furtherly confirmed, by using several different measures of 
cognitive ability, in a great deal of research (e.g. Burks et al. 2009; Dohmen et al. 2010; 
Benjamin et al. 2013; Cueva et al. 2015).  
However, recent evidence argues that the relation found in the above results may be 
spurious. Andersson et al. (2013) suggest that the effect of cognitive ability on risk 
preferences is biased by noise, depending on the gamble presented. In their study (based on 
the same outset of data from iLEE as used in the present study) they found that a bias is 
definitely at hand. However, they show that cognitive ability decreases how affected an 
individual is by this noise, and thus, the bias will be less intense. If the less cognitively able 
individuals were not biased by the structure of the test, they might be as efficient as 
individuals with higher cognitive ability in their choices. And thus, we cannot say anything 
about the performance of low cognitive ability individuals from these tests. This, in turn, is 
what makes the results spurious. We will describe this bias in more detail in section 4.2.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 The Scholastic Achievement Test for mathematical skills. 
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2.2 Cognitive ability and gender 
In addition, when investigating the CRT, Frederick (2005) found an interesting result 
regarding the scores and differences in gender. In his analysis, women scored significantly 
lower than men, even when controlling for SAT scores. This result has gained a lot of 
attention lately, and has by that been replicated and further validated by a large literature (e.g. 
Oechssler et al. 2009; Obrecht et al. 2009; Brañas-Garza et al. 2012; Cueva et al. 2015). 
However, not only did he observe that women, on average, obtained lower scores than men, 
he also found that the women who had submitted a wrong answer, in further extension than 
men, tended to give an intuitive response, whereas men who did not manage to find the 
correct answer, more often, submitted a random response. Supplementary, Cueva et al. (2015) 
also discovered that women’s answers on the CRT were more intuitive than those of men, 
when considering the incorrectly answered questions. This is a result which, along the line of 
the dual-process theory, possibly could be explained by the differences in CR between 
genders, observing that women who tend to obtain a lower CRT score also act more 
impulsive, than men in the corresponding situation.   
When Campitelli and Labollita (2010) examine the relation of CR and the sex variable, 
their results regarding the correlation between cognitive reflection scores and gender were in 
line with those of Frederick (2005), though not significantly. On the other hand, they were not 
able to find any support for the fact that women would be more inclined to make intuitive 
errors than men, in opposition to the results mentioned above. 
Moving on to other measures of cognitive ability, with focus on different IQ tests, in 
relation to gender, generally, these do not seem to differ particularly between men and 
women, in the way that CR seemingly does (Halpern et al. 2011). However, a more extensive 
discussion on this topic will be held in section 3.2.  
 
2.3 Cognitive ability and response time   
We have come across several researchers who have investigated response times in 
different economic settings of decision making (e.g. Rubinstein, 2007; Piovesan and 
Wengström, 2008; Brañas-Garza et al. 2012; Nielsen et al. 2014; Cappelen et al. 2014). For 
example, Rubinstein (2007) suggests that “choices made instinctively, that is, on the basis of 
an emotional response, require less response time than choices that require the use of 
cognitive reasoning.” (p. 1243). By categorizing actions as being cognitive, instinctive and 
reasonless, he finds support for this idea through a review of several economic games and the 
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response times of the included tasks. Still we have not yet seen research that specifically 
focuses their analysis on the CRT, as a measure of cognitive ability, in relation to decision 
speed. This in fact, could be thought of as fairly strange, as CR and the time spent on decision 
making, are two concepts assumed to be closely related, originating from a dual-process view.  
Given that previous research in this specific domain seems to be quite scarce, we have 
found one analysis, even if more or less out of our context, that discuss this relationship. 
Studying the influence of individual differences in CRT scores on performance in judgmental 
time-series forecasting, Moritz et al. (2014) firstly raise some concerns regarding the results 
of different decision times, by discussing the possibility of under- or over-thinking a decision. 
As under-thinking may be connected to a more intuitive behaviour, over-thinking in turn is 
connected to more deliberation and reflection. The authors mean that a reflective behaviour 
must not be improving decision making at all times, as the phenomenon of over-thinking in 
some situations rather may decrease it. This is due to the fact that a longer decision time may 
make it harder for individuals to find proper weighting schemes for different decisions. 
Interestingly, the authors find that a higher CRT score is linked to a lesser tendency of over- 
and under-thinking decisions, as the individuals with high CRT consistently spent a more 
moderate amount of time in making their decisions, in this case meaning that they were closer 
to the decision time the authors had predicted in advance (Moritz et al. 2014). Thus, they 
were, in general, not victims of over-thinking, as one could have expected, considering the 
connection to a more thoughtful behaviour, but instead these individuals managed to 
overcome this barrier.  
Consequently, as the individuals who scored high on the CRT, were consistently more 
moderate in making their decisions, they found that these individuals displayed a lower 
variance in decision speed, in contrast to the individuals with lower scores. Further on, they 
noticed that high CRT scoring individuals performed better forecasts (even when controlling 
for intelligence as the Wonderlic Personnel Test, WPT
2
). Following, they found that notably 
long or short decision times produced higher forecast errors than moderate decision times. To 
conclude, they suggest that manipulating decision times may help to improve decision 
performance, at least in their specific context of forecasting.  
Moving over to response times in relation to intelligence, the field is considerably wider, 
not surprisingly, regarding the difference in time that these two types of measures have 
existed. The results seem to be mixed, some prior literature suggests a negative relation 
                                               
2
 See section 3.2 for a description of the Wonderlic Personnel Test. 
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between intelligence and decision time (Bates and Stough, 1997), whereas for example 
Cappelen et al. (2014) find that response times are not driven by differences in cognitive 
ability, measured as a 20-item progressive matrices test (IQ). 
 
2.4 Cognitive ability and public good and dictator games  
The investigation of how social preferences, for example seen as the traits of being fair, 
cooperative or selfish, are related to one's cognitive ability, has been broadly viewed by 
researchers in the form of public good and dictator games. The results, regarding of finding 
evidence of any prediction at all, seem to be quite mixed. For example, Brandstätter and Güth 
(2002) investigate the relationship between cognitive ability, measured as self-reported 
intelligence from questions on individual abilities, and choices made in a dictator and 
ultimatum game. They find that intelligence, for the most part, is not predictive of the 
participants choices. Additionally, Benjamin et al. (2013) find that cognitive ability does not 
predict an individual’s giving in a dictator game, implying that there is no connection between 
cognitive ability and social preferences. However, as mentioned in the previous section, 
Cappelen et al. (2014) find that response times are not affected by differences in IQ, still they 
find that selfishness is connected to a longer response time, i.e. a more deliberate behaviour, 
whereas fairness is strongly connected to a shorter response time, i.e. a more intuitive 
behaviour. Assuming that IQ and CR measure different dimensions of cognitive ability, and 
on the basis of dual-process theory, the connection between actions and response times, could 
make one start wondering if this behaviour was partly due to differences in CR. If believing 
so, then one could also assume that high CR is associated with selfishness, and low CR with 
the probability of being cooperative. However, Nielsen et al. (2014) further confirm the 
previous result, controlling for cognitive ability, both as a progressive matrices test as well as 
the CRT, and find that the longer response times of free riders is not driven by differences in 
these measures. Instead they suggest that that their finding is caused by the fact that free riders 
need more time to deliberate and overcome the moral dilemma of being selfish or not. 
Nevertheless, they observe a positive relation of being a free rider and CRT scores.  
 
2.5 Cognitive ability and rationality 
  When we examine individual differences in cognitive functioning by traditional 
intelligence tests, they do not seem to measure all dimensions of cognitive abilities, and do 
not include assessment of rational thinking skills (Stanovich et al. 2011). The CRT, on the 
other hand, has been proven to strongly correlate with this trait (Toplak et al. 2011). Bearing 
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in mind that individual differences in rational thinking are mainly driven by differences in 
type 2 processing, the former is not surprising, as rationality thereby is linked to a more 
reflective thinking. In the domain of decision making, economists and cognitive scientists 
define rational judgement of an individual as making decisions in terms to maximize expected 
utility, and along this line, also the definition that we will proceed from in our analysis. If one, 
for some reason, diverges from such behaviour, this individual may be a victim of one or 
several cognitive biases. One way to assess rationality is then to examine if, and if so, to what 
degree an individual exhibits any kind of bias that affects rationality in decision making. 
Going back to the relation to traditional measures of intelligence, as already mentioned above, 
these are lacking in assessment of this trait as well as related ones, and are therefore bad 
predictors of rational thinking and behaviour (Stanovich et al. 2011).  
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 System 1 and 2 
The dual-process system theory, mentioning the terms system 1 and 2, was first presented 
by Stanovich and West (2000). They announced that our cognitive process can be separated 
into two different systems. Kahneman (2013), however, really brought the matter to life. In 
his striking book, he describes system 1 as the fast system, which is basically always switched 
on as default. System 2, he describes as the slow system, which only comes to use if really 
necessary. The reason for this difference is that system 2 is very effortful. Unfortunately, 
system 2 is the “smart” system. It is used for harder tasks and complicated decisions, or 
whenever more advanced thinking is required. It is slower than system 1, because it needs 
time to make a decision carefully. However, as mentioned, it tires easily, as it requires a large 
amount of energy to be active. The basically always active system 1 is the intuitive system; it 
makes fast decisions that are not very deliberate. It works automatically (like an autopilot), 
and thus, does not require the same amount of energy as system 2. It often works in moments 
of danger, because it is highly sensitive, and hence, is constructed of an intuitive nature. The 
downside of this system is that it is filled with biases, different situation specific errors, in the 
choices it makes, due to the fast, inconsiderate thinking process. However, it should not be 
interpreted as a bad system of any sort, because, most of the time, it works perfectly well and 
does its job. Furthermore, the two systems work in sync in a very efficient way. 
One can argue that the use of system 2, or at least the quality of system 2, is somehow 
connected to cognitive ability. Both systems are connected, of course, because a lot of the 
intuitive knowledge that system 1 holds is taught and not congenital. It principally consists of 
common knowledge, which of course increases when an individual undergoes education, and 
this is often linked to a higher cognitive ability. However, the tasks that system 2 is able to 
solve, must be connected to cognitive ability on a higher level. It might therefore be relevant 
to assume that a higher cognitive ability could relate to a better skilled system 2. 
The main reason to study this difference is to find out why certain individuals are more 
prone to be biased in different situations of decision making. Because, if cognitive ability is 
connected to these systems, and if they generate different outcomes (intuitive and sometimes 
sloppy, vs. deliberate and accurate), it could explain why some individuals behave in a more 
biased way than others. It would additionally help solve the mystery of rationality in 
humanity. According to Stanovich (2012), intelligence is not the same as rationality. Being 
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intelligent, in the sense of having a high IQ, does not mean having immunity to biases in 
decision making. And therefore, studying other areas of the cognitive ability in humans, such 
as cognitive reflection, might give us added information about the differences in decision 
making and why some individuals are more prone to be biased than others. Kahneman (2013) 
also suggests further research in this field and concludes that “Time will tell whether the 
distinction between intelligence and rationality can lead to new discoveries.” (p. 49). 
Evans and Stanovich (2013) collect criticism of the different dual-system theories and 
summarize a discussion about these in an article, which basically describes the situation 
today. Most of the critique regards the lacking clarity of the definition, a concern that already 
has been raised by many (e.g. Keren & Shul, 2009), and some also have empirical evidence 
against some of the statements that the theories make. Many find the terminology of system 1 
and 2 to be confusing, because it is in fact the same system working, however, different ways 
of processing information. That is why a majority of those who have used this terminology 
have gone back to use the former terms of type 1 and 2 processing instead. They conclude, 
that all the defining features originally made, might not necessarily hold. However, they do 
believe that type 1 processing is linked with autonomous processing and type 2 with, what 
Evans and Stanovich (2013) call “...the ability to sustain the decoupling of secondary 
representations...” (p. 237). They also agree on this field still being under development, 
especially with all the recent research proving and disproving the different aspects of the 
theories.  
 
3.2  Intelligence Quotient  
One of the primarily used ways of measuring cognitive ability is by the intelligence 
quotient (IQ). The modern approach of this intelligence testing originates from the work of 
Alfred Binet, a French psychologist assigned by the French Ministry of Education to detect 
less talented students in a fast and low-cost way, to make division into different classes more 
effective, after the introduction of universal primary education in France, during the 20th 
century. His work was later developed by William Stern, among others, who is considered to 
be the creator of the original intelligence quotient, which according to him represented an 
individual’s mental age divided by his or her chronological age (Mackintosh, 2011). Later on, 
Sterns work has also been revised by many, and today there exist several different types of 
tests to measure this quotient. One of the most commonly used IQ-tests today, is the latest 
version of those invented by David Wechsler; The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) 
IV (Urbina, 2011). In contrast to Sterns description of the IQ score, Wechsler refined the 
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definition so that his tests measured the “deviation IQ”, a comparison between the IQ score of 
an individual and the corresponding average obtained by others in the same age (Mackintosh, 
2011). Thus, it is worth to keep in mind, that the IQ score is only a rank of your position in 
terms of cognitive ability in relation to all other individuals, rather than a grading score. This 
is the typical way to score tests today, where the mean score of most tests is at 100, with a 
standard deviation of 15-16 (Urbina, 2011).  
As there exist more than a few different IQ-measures, we cannot discuss all of them in this 
essay, but we have chosen to mention two additional test. These are also commonly used 
among researchers who examine cognitive ability, and are the ones we have encountered the 
most during our research; The Wonderlic Personnel Test and Raven’s Progressive Matrices. 
The WPT consists of 50 questions that have to be completed in 12 minutes. The problems are 
based on various fields of knowledge such as mathematical and verbal ability, to mention a 
few, and are thereby considered to be a good estimate of general cognitive ability (Matthews 
and Lassiter, 2007). Raven’s Progressive Matrices, on the other hand, is constructed of a 
series of visual problems, where the participant is supposed to determine which out of several 
alternative images is missing, in order to solve an incomplete puzzle (Raven, 2000). There 
exists several versions of this test and it is untimed. Raven’s Matrices is considered to 
measure non-verbal cognitive ability, which means that it is not influenced by cultural 
differences due to verbal skills (Urbina, 2011, p. 29). 
Although there exists all these different measures of IQ, most of them are strongly 
correlated (Borghans et al. 2008). Moving over to general correlations to IQ, beyond the 
relations to risk preferences, as mentioned in section 2.1, IQ scores have been found to be 
related to numerous of other economic preferences, as well as several different individual 
characteristics, such as mortality, income, wealth, etc. (Sternberg and Kaufman, 2011). 
Regarding economic preferences, it has also been shown to relate to time preferences, 
implying that higher intelligence is connected to higher patience (Burks et al. 2009; Dohmen 
et al. 2010).  
 On the other hand, IQ does not seem to be specifically related to gender. Research has 
shown that men and women possess divergent abilities when it comes to different fields of 
tasks. For example, men generally perform better than women in mathematical domains, 
whereas women, on the other hand, on average, perform better on tasks that examine verbal 
skills. Today, as most IQ tests are designed in order to be adjusted from overall gender 
differences, meaning that they do not have any particular bias towards a specific gender, there 
is, in most circumstances, no difference to be found in average IQ between men and women 
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(Halpern et al. 2011). This relation, in itself, is a considerable issue, beyond the scope of this 
essay. Therefore, as only a small branch of our study, it will be overseen in a general 
perspective, and we will not go any further into the discussion of underlying factors.  
Moving over to a discussion about IQ and age, several interesting relations have been 
found.  In short, it is difficult to assess intelligence in childhood, as children express a huge 
variation in their behaviour, and thus, also in intelligence, during their early years. Most 
intelligence tests are constructed to measure stable cognitive skills, and are therefore not 
applicable on very young individuals (Rose & Fischer, 2011). When we later reach adulthood, 
a majority of research is consistent with the fact that, in general, most traits of, and thus 
overall, cognitive ability seems to decline as we are aging. One of the traits where the largest 
differences can be observed is in processing speed (Hertzog, 2011).  
Finally, in this study, the Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000 R, a test which is closely 
related to Raven’s Progressive Matrices, has been used as a measure of IQ. For further 
description and motivation of this test, view section 4.2.3. 
 
3.3 The Cognitive Reflection Test 
Frederick (2005) constructed the three item “Cognitive Reflection Test” (CRT) for one 
type of cognitive ability, that he suggested measured “cognitive reflection”, which he defined 
as; “…the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind.” (p. 
35). The idea behind the test is based on the theory of a dual-process system, consisting of 
system 1, using a fast and intuitive processing, and system 2, using a more deliberate and 
thoughtful processing, when performing different tasks. The CRT is created such that the 
questions are supposed to first generate an intuitive and incorrect answer, triggered by system 
1, which then can be driven away by a deeper reflection, and thus, through an activation of 
system 2. This in turn implies that people with a higher CR, use their system 2 more 
frequently than others, when deciding on their response, and thus, also have a better response 
rate (Moritz et al. 2014).  
As already discussed in section 2.2, CR seems to differ between genders. However, there 
does not seem to exist equally strong evidence that CR would differ between age groups. 
Campitelli and Labollita (2010) examine the relation of these variables and find the 
correlation to be significant only at the ten percent level. Considering that other measures of 
cognitive ability have been found to decline with age, as mentioned in section 3.2, it is not 
impossible to assume that the same relation holds for CR, as it has proven to positively 
correlate with several other measures of cognitive ability, such as academic achievement as 
18 
 
well as various measures of IQ. For example, Frederick (2005) found a positive correlation 
between CRT scores and the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT), the Need For Cognition scale 
(NFC)
3
, self-reported Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) and American College Testing 
(ACT) scores. Cueva et al. (2015), as well as Obrecht et al. (2009) provide further support to 
the findings regarding academic achievement, as the former observe that GPA (Grade Point 
Average) is positively correlated to the CRT, and in the same direction, the latter detect a 
correlation of 0.45
4
 between CRT performance and SAT scores. The relation between CR and 
different kinds of IQ measures will be discussed further in section 3.4. 
Regarding the relation of CR and social preferences, some have investigated how the 
CRT is related to traits of the Big-five personality test, for a further discussion of the 
implications of this test, see section 4.2.2. For example, Cueva et al. (2015) find that CRT 
scores are negatively correlated to Extraversion and Neuroticism. Similarly, Cokely et al. 
(2012) add to the finding of CRT scores being negatively related to Extraversion, as well as to 
Openness. Finally, to mention a few, some other variables that have been found to relate to 
CR are; working memory (Toplak et al. 2011), numeracy (Obrecht et al. 2009), time 
preferences (Frederick, 2005) and rational thinking (Toplak et al. 2011).  
As earlier studies have shown that CR is related to numeracy, as well as academic 
achievement, this may also suggest that the impact of CR in decision making could be due to 
the correlation with these abilities (Frederick, 2005). Convincingly, Campitelli and Labollita 
(2010) offer evidence in dispute to this proposal, examining whether individual differences in 
these types of general knowledge (i.e. numeracy and academic achievement) could be the 
cause of CRs effect on decision making. They conclude that this effect is neither due to 
differences in numeracy, as they still were able to find an effect when investigating tasks that 
did not need any mathematical figuring, nor due to differences in academic achievement. 
Thus, in line with Frederick (2005), they conclude, regarding the effect of CR, that there 
exists at least an indication of some individual strength in the CR measure, which affects 
performance in decision making.  
Even though the CRT has been proven as a worthy measure of cognitive ability, it is to 
some extent lacking in the sense of future application. As the test simply consists of three 
short questions, it has been vastly exploited in various surroundings since its origin, above all 
                                               
3
 Need for cognition (NFC) is commonly described as enjoying complex thinking (high NFC), which can be 
related to a higher cognitive ability (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). 
4 Correlations are measured as Pearson’s correlations coefficients, and range between -1 and +1, where +1 
corresponds to perfect positive correlation, -1 to a perfect negative correlation, and 0 to no correlation. 
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in educational purposes. This implies that future subjects of interest already might be familiar 
with the obstacles of these questions as well as their correct answers (Toplak et al. 2014). 
Trying to solve this problem, Toplak et al. (2014) constructed four new questions, in 
collaboration with Shane Frederick, among others, that have not already been exploited as the 
original ones. They add these to the initial test, and thus, created a 7 item expansion of the 
original 3 item CRT. According to their research, the 4 item CRT presented a 0.58 correlation 
with the 3 item test, as well as it demonstrated a comparable relationship with measures of 
cognitive ability and various rational thinking tasks.  
However, it is worth to keep in mind, that this is only a temporary solution, as these newly 
created questions in time will face the same destiny as the original ones, and the usage of the 
CRT will again get weaker in terms of reliability.
5
 Therefore we wonder about how good of a 
solution this really is, as the CRT questions would need to be updated continuously to resist 
this threat. It would consequently be of interest to study the prospect of CRT usage closer in 
the future, and to see if and how one could find a more effective proposition. Maybe it is 
possible to measure the same dimension of cognitive ability, as with the CRT, using a more 
persistent method.  
 
3.4 Cognitive reflection as a measure of cognitive ability 
There have been several thoughts about what the CRT really measures, and how well it 
actually measures what it is supposed to measure. Campitelli and Gerrans (2014) discuss 
some of the most debated opinions in their paper, and sort out which of these they believe 
should have the most support. The primarily debated opinions about the CRT are whether the 
test measures mathematical ability, rational thinking and/or open-minded thinking. What they 
find is that the CRT does not measure pure mathematical abilities, however, that it might be a 
measure of mathematical ability in combination with rational thinking, or mathematical 
ability in combination with both rational and open-minded thinking. However, Welsh et al. 
(2013) discuss whether the accomplishment of the CRT is due to the fact that it is just 
another, more precise, measure of numerical skills rather than a broader measure of cognitive 
ability.  As many others, they prove that the CRT is strongly related to numeracy, and that the 
effect of CRT largely can be explained by this fact, and accordingly may be redundant. As 
follows, they suggest in their conclusion; “...that ‘cognitive reflection’ may not be 
                                               
5
 This, however, is a problem only for the CRT, because the recognition for these questions are much higher than 
for the IQ tests, for example, as these first of all include a lot more problems, and these are often constructed of 
illustrations, not as easily remembered as the CRT questions. 
20 
 
metacognitive as Frederick (2005) describes but, rather, measure a person’s ability to quickly 
recognize bad math.” (p. 1592). 
Frederick (2005) himself also discusses the validity of the CRT, in particular whether it is 
just another IQ-test on the market, or if it actually does capture another dimension of 
cognitive ability. As mentioned in section 3.3, he compared the CRT scores with several other 
cognitive ability test scores, and all were significantly and positively correlated. This result 
has been further confirmed between CR and several measures of IQ, which are the two types 
of cognitive abilities that we focus on in this study. For example, Brañas-Garza et al. (2012) 
found a 0.29 correlation between scoring on the Raven’s Matrices and the CRT. Further on, 
Moritz et al. (2014) discovered a correlation of 0.44 between the WPT and the CRT, in line 
with Frederick (2005), who found a correlation of 0.43 between the two measures. Looking 
closer to the cause of the result, they find something interesting; the high correlation of the 
two measures is basically due to the fact that individuals who reported a low WPT score, 
extensively also reported a low CRT score. The reverse relationship, on the other hand, was 
not observed, as they did not find a specific pattern in CRT scores for those who reported a 
high WPT score, instead their scores could be either high or low with almost the same rate of 
recurrence. This indicates that low IQ scores are closely related to low CR whereas high IQ 
scores are not predictive of CR.  
Further on, Toplak et al. (2011) found that CRT scores have a 0.4 correlation with the 
vocabulary and matrix reasoning subtests from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI)
6
. Despite to these findings (the considerable correlation with cognitive 
ability), when examining the unique prediction power of the CRT, they discover that it 
explained a larger unique variance (in fact more than double) than the IQ measure. 
Consequently, they conclude that the CRT is a very powerful predictor of heuristics-and-
biases tasks, whereas they consider the latter to be merely moderate. This result was also 
observed by Frederick (2005), who found that the CRT scores gave the best indication of 
cognitive ability, for a series of decision making tasks, among the different test that he was 
analysing. Similarly, Moritz et al. (2014) found that CRT scores positively affected 
performance, independent of IQ. Hence, they conclude that, although they seem to measure, 
at least partly, an interrelated effect when it comes to decision making, it has been shown that 
in this domain, CR alone can offer further information beyond IQ.  
                                               
6
 The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) is an abbreviated version of the original Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) test.  
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Both CR and IQ have been found to positively correlate with measures such as numeracy, 
academic achievement and time preferences. However, one of the main differencing variables 
in relation to these measures, accordingly to previous research (see section 2.2), seems to be 
gender. As mentioned on this subject, researchers generally do not find any significant 
differences between male and female average IQ (see section 3.2), whereas a majority of 
earlier studies, in contrast, have found a conflicting relationship between CRT scores and 
gender, indicating that men in general would have a higher cognitive reflection than women. 
This could possibly, to some extent, be explained by the matter that men, on average, seem to 
perform better than women on tasks of mathematical structure, and thus could benefit from 
the design of the CRT. 
 
3.5 Risk and loss aversion 
  Risk aversion is a very well-known phenomenon in economics, and can basically be 
described as a characteristic that makes an individual choose a safe option before a risky 
option, even though, the risky option has a better expected outcome (Wilkinson & Klaes, 
2012, p. 151-152). A related, but not as known, phenomenon is loss aversion. It was founded 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1984), and basically means that individuals are more averse 
towards a loss than an equally sized gain. That is, losing 10 is a worse loss than winning 10 is 
in gain, even though the amount is the same (10). We will not explain this in detail, but 
merely wanted to define these concepts, since we, to some extent, will attend to them in this 
study. 
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4 Data 
 
4.1 Data selection 
In our analysis we use data from the Internet Laboratory for Experimental Economics 
(iLEE) at Copenhagen University.
7
 The iLEE conducts large-scale internet based experiments 
on randomly selected individuals from the Danish population in the age range 18-80, and has 
today completed four waves of experiments. 
We have used selected data from the first two waves of the experiment, iLEE1 and iLEE2, 
in our research. We have chosen to include all observations from participants who completed 
the first wave for the experiments from iLEE1, and data from participants who completed the 
second wave for the experiments from iLEE2. The first experiment studies cooperation 
behaviour in relation to features such as characteristics and personality of the participants 
through a one-shot public good game. In addition to this game, iLEE1 also includes a CRT 
test, Big-five personality test, Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000 R (I-S-T 2000 R), risk and loss 
preference examination (decision making) as well as some background questions. The second 
experiment is based on a real effort dictator game which they use to study sharing and 
redistribution choices. It also includes similar risk and loss preference tests as the iLEE1. All 
of these tests will be described closer in section 4.2. 
 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics of participants 
Our final samples from iLEE1 and iLEE2 consist of 2291 and 1340 participants 
respectively. It should be noticed that all participants in iLEE2 first had taken part in, and 
completed, iLEE1. 
When comparing the characteristics age and gender from our data, with statistics of the 
general Danish population (Danmarks Statistik, 2015), we find that our samples are not fully 
representative in these areas. Regarding gender, we find that men are slightly overrepresented 
in both iLEE1 and iLEE2. Furthermore, concerning the age variable, we find that middle-aged 
individuals are overrepresented, whereas the young and the old individuals are 
underrepresented, a result that also holds for both iLEE1 and iLEE2. However, our sample 
does not differ dramatically from the population, and thus, we find that our results are 
representable of the population from the factors we have observed. 
                                               
7
 A complete description of the platform and the implementation of all waves can be found at  
http://www.econ.ku.dk/cee/ilee/description/. 
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4.1.2 Dropped data in different games 
We have dropped a few observations for some of the analyses in this study. Firstly, in the 
decision making analysis, we do not include participants who have been irrational in their 
choices. This is discussed in further detail in section 5.1.4. Secondly, for the time analysis 
part, we dropped observations from participants who seemed to take more time than necessary 
to perform the different tasks. We discuss this further in section 5.1.6. 
 
4.2 Description of tests and games 
 
4.2.1 Cognitive reflection test 
The CRT consists of the following three questions
8
; 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost? _____ cents (intuitive: $0.10, correct: $0.05) 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? _____ minutes (intuitive: 100 min, correct: 5 min) 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days 
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the 
lake? _____ days (intuitive: 24 days, correct: 47 days) 
The results are measured by the number of questions answered correctly. Thus, the scale 
goes from 0 to 3 (0, 1, 2, 3), where 3 points represents a full score, that is, all questions were 
answered correctly. Later in this study, we will be separating the test scores into two groups, 
high and low CR. The high CR group will consist of participants who answered two or more 
questions correctly, whereas the low CR group will consist of the participants answering 1 or 
no questions correctly. 
 
4.2.2 Big-five personality test 
This test measures personality by five specific traits. Openness, which describes how 
conventional and conservative an individual is. A high score means being open for 
experience. This trait reflects a person's intellect. Conscientiousness reflects the measure of 
organization a person lives after. If this score is high, the person is probably very dependable, 
punctual and generally organized in most aspects of his/her life. Extraversion is the social 
trait, and describes how active a person is among other people. Agreeableness is a measure of 
                                               
8
 Intuitive (and incorrect) as well as correct answers are presented in parentheses after each question. 
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helpfulness, and of a person’s beliefs about other people. A high score here means being 
helpful, and thinking others will be helpful in return. Neuroticism is basically the grade of 
emotional stability. If a person is very neurotic, he/she is emotionally unstable, and thus easily 
scared, nervous and embarrassed. 
The test is constructed by several statements per trait, which all can be answered by a 
scale of five alternatives, from “This is 100 % wrong, I strongly disagree” to “This is 100% 
correct, I strongly agree”. For every trait one can score from 0 to 48 points. 
 
4.2.3 IQ test 
The Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000 R is a “culture-free” test, which means that it is not 
based on testing verbal knowledge. The test consists of 20 questions, all with pictures of 
different shapes and forms where the participant must pick the missing illustration from a row 
of alternatives. The IQ score is measured by the number of questions answered correctly, and 
thus, ranges from 0 to 20 (0, 1, 2, …, 20). A test score of 9.6 corresponds to an IQ of 100 (the 
test can measure IQ between 60 and 150). The I-S-T 2000 R is closely related to Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices, which is helpful in our discussion and comparison between results. 
As with the CRT, we will later in this study be separating the test scores into two groups, 
high and low IQ. The high IQ group will be participants who scored 11-20 questions 
correctly, whereas the low IQ group will be the participants scoring 0-10. 
 
4.2.4 Risk and loss preferences 
In this part, the participants have to choose between two series of 50 percent chance 
lotteries, in which one lottery is riskier than the other, for a total of ten lotteries in the risk 
gamble, and seven in the loss gamble. The risky choice gets riskier for every lottery in 
relation to the safe choice. However, the expected payoff for the risky choice increases for 
each lottery, which implies that a rational individual chooses the risky lottery at some point. A 
risk neutral individual chooses the risky lottery as soon as the expected payoff of that lottery 
exceeds the expected payoff of the safe lottery. In the risk aversion gamble, only lotteries with 
gains are presented. The risk neutral individual will then switch to the risky lottery at the third 
decision. In the loss aversion gamble, both the safe and the risky lottery include a possible 
loss. The risk neutral individual will then choose the risky lottery at the second decision. The 
reason why we choose to examine two very similar tasks is that we want to be able to see if 
individuals are affected by the fact that a loss is possible. It is reasonable to believe that 
people act differently when choosing between two lotteries that both generate gains, than 
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between lotteries where possible losses are involved. We want to make sure that this possible 
difference is acknowledged. 
The measure of risk and loss preferences is the shift point, that is, at what point the 
participant chooses the risky lottery over the safe one. If an individual chooses to switch 
before the risk neutral shift point, it implies risk seeking preferences, if the choice is made 
after the risk neutral point, it implies risk averse preferences. Since there are 10 choices for 
the risk gamble, the scale goes from 1 to 11 (11 corresponding to choosing the safe lottery 
every time, and 1 corresponding to choosing the risky lottery in the first decision), and for the 
loss gamble, it goes from 1 to 8 (8 corresponding to choosing the safe lottery every time, and 
1 corresponding to choosing the risky lottery in the first decision). Notable here is that 
whenever a rational individual has chosen the risky lottery, he/she will never go back to 
choosing the safe lottery, since the expected payoff of the risky lottery will increase for later 
lotteries (see section 5.1.4 for further discussion on this matter).  
 The description above holds for iLEE1, and the same principle holds for iLEE2, however, 
there are 10 lotteries for both the risk and the loss gambles in this wave, and also, for the loss 
aversion gamble, the safe choice only involves gains. In the risk gamble, the risk neutral 
individual will switch at decision 6, and in the loss gamble, at decision 9. The participants, 
who have performed the iLEE2, have also performed the iLEE1, and thus, a similar task. 
However, these tests are constructed differently, with the risk neutral shift points at different 
positions in the gambles. Andersson et al. (2013) have used the same dataset as in the present 
study, and found that noise can bias the choice of shift point, and depending on where the risk 
neutral choice is placed in the gamble, the bias will go in different directions. They show that 
when the risk neutral choice is placed early in the gamble (as in iLEE1), more available errors 
will exist later on in the gamble, and therefore, the bias would on average be downwards, that 
is, the risk is overestimated. And vice versa if the risk neutral choice is placed late in the 
gamble (as in iLEE2), which will induce an underestimation of the risk. This is very important 
to keep in mind, because it can imply that the results from these tests are merely spurious. A 
further discussion on this matter can be found in section 6.2.1. 
 
4.2.5 Public good game 
In the public good game, the participants are supposed to make one unconditional choice, 
regarding an amount of money to contribute (or withdraw) into (from) a pot of money, which 
will be doubled and then split equally among four group members (including the participant). 
The participants who completed the iLEE1 were selected into three different categories for the 
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public good game. Two of them were so called givers, that is, they had 50 DKK to start with, 
and could choose to put any amount of that money into the shared pot. The givers, per se, are 
divided into the categories give and hypothetical. The give individuals actually got paid the 
amount resulting from the game, whereas the hypothetical group did not, but still, they were 
asked to play the game as if they were being paid. The last category was take; where the 
participants instead could withdraw money from the pot which then contained 200 DKK to 
begin with (they could withdraw a maximum amount of 50 DKK). Takers also got paid the 
resulting amount. 
 
4.2.6 Dictator game 
In the dictator game, the participants are being told that they are matched with another 
individual. Both start out with 75 DKK. The active participant is then told to be the dictator, 
that is, he/she decides how the money is distributed between them. He/she can choose to give 
any amount of his/her money to the other (passive) individual or take any amount of the 
passive individual’s money. The active participant can also choose to do nothing, leaving 
them both with an equal amount. After the dictator has made his/her choice, he/she is paired 
with another individual and the roles reverse, thus he/she becomes the passive participant. 
One of these two situations will then be paid to the participants, however, they will of course 
not know which one in advance. 
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5 Analysis 
 
We aim to examine the difference between the cognitive ability measures CR and IQ in a 
series of decision making tasks. First, we want to show the effects of these measures on the 
actual outcome of the games. This is followed by our main analysis, where we aim to analyse 
the differences in decision times for each game. We do hypothesise there to be differences, 
especially in decision time, because the CRT is, unlike IQ tests, based on dual-process theory, 
and thus, a measure of the ability of system 2. Hence, a high score on the CRT is assumed be 
related to consideration, deliberation and slower, but often better, decisions. Consequently, we 
do not only hypothesise high scorers on the CRT to be slower, decision time wise, but also 
that they will act more efficient than low scorers. This section will first hold a descriptive 
statistics section, and is then followed by the methods and results of the analyses.  
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
5.1.1 Correlations 
 Table 1 presents the correlations between the main variables included in the analysis. 
This is mainly interesting because it motivates why these variables should be included. 
 
Table 1 
Correlations between variables 
 
crscore iqscore big5a big5c big5e big5o big5n age sex edu 
crscore 1.0000 
         
iqscore 0.2898*** 1.0000 
        
big5a -0.0487** -0.0568*** 1.0000 
       
big5c -0.0036 0.0120 0.1057*** 1.0000 
      
big5e -0.0185 0.1019*** -0.0515** 0.2644*** 1.0000 
     
big5o 0.0858*** 0.0753*** 0.0161 0.0041 0.2828*** 1.0000 
    
big5n -0.0787*** 0.0127 -0.0429** -0.4517*** -0.3734*** 0.0249 1.0000 
   
age -0.0184 -0.3993*** 0.1639*** 0.0893*** -0.1749*** -0.0189 -0.1210*** 1.0000 
  
sex -0.1824*** 0.0112 0.2527*** 0.0099 -0.0186 0.0564*** 0.2488*** -0.0596*** 1.0000 
 
edu 0.1512*** 0.1024*** 0.0279 0.0812*** 0.0699*** 0.2103*** -0.0741 *** 0.0337 0.0793*** 1.0000 
Notes: Pearson’s correlation coefficients. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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All variables correlate significantly with either CR score or IQ score or both (except 
big5c), motivating that they should be included in the regressions, in order to isolate the actual 
effect that the scores have on the situations we analyse. 
Since one of the main focuses in this paper is the difference between CR and IQ, this 
result is of special interest (marked bold in table 1). The measures significantly correlate 
positively. It is a medium strong correlation, indicating that they do differ, quite a lot in fact, 
validating our theory about the tests measuring, and in some extent capturing, different 
dimensions of cognitive ability. However, the correlation is positive, which is an important 
observation, because even if they capture cognitive ability in different ways, we still 
anticipated that they would be positively related to each other. This result, in terms of similar 
correlations between CR and different measures of IQ, approximately ranging between 0.3-
0.45, has been observed by many researchers, as discussed in section 3.4. 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of individuals with low and high CR and IQ 
respectively. This is a matter discussed in prior studies, and it has been found that a low IQ 
relates to a low CR, whereas a high IQ has not been shown relate to a specific level of CR 
(Moritz et al. 2014). From our sample we can see that it is not obvious that the two measures 
relate, an individual can be high in CR and low in IQ, and vice versa, however, it seems to be 
rare to have high IQ and low CR in relation to the other combinations. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
The distribution of high and low CR and IQ respectively amongst participants. 
 
High IQ and CR 
19% 
High IQ Low CR 
10% 
Low IQ High CR 
30% 
Low IQ and CR 
41% 
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5.1.2 Cognitive reflection 
In table 2, we present the average CR scores received by the participants. We also 
examine the differences in gender, age and education. 
 
Table 2 
Average CR scores from the CRT and t-values 
Total Gender Age Education 
 Men Women 18-29 30-60 61-80 Basic 
High 
school 
Short 
Uni 
Long 
Uni 
1.473 
(1.100) 
1.668 
(1.074) 
1.266 
(1.091) 
1.489 
(1.163) 
1.499 
(1.090) 
1.361 
(1.084) 
1.210 
(1.088) 
1.374 
(1.101) 
1.425 
(1.087) 
1.914 
(1.028) 
 t(2289) = 8.874*** 
t(1879) =  
0.147 
t(1954) = 
2.289** 
t(819) = 
1.953* 
t(1652)= 
-0.906 
t(1468) =  
-7.749*** 
Notes: Average CR scores with standard deviations in parenthesis from the iLEE1. t-test results
9
 presented 
below the measures tested. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We found a significant difference in CR scores between the male and female participants. 
Males scored significantly higher on the CRT than the females. Additionally, we found that 
the group of elders (61-80 years old) scored significantly lower on the CRT than the middle-
age group (30-60). However, we could not find any significant differences between the 
younger (18-29) and the middle-aged. Further on, we could observe some educational 
differences, where basic educated individuals scored significantly lower than high school 
educated, and individuals with a long education at the university scored higher than those with 
a shorter education at the university. We did not find any difference between high school 
educated individuals and those with a short education at the university. Table 2 only presents 
results from the iLEE1, however, since all participants who finished iLEE2 also have finished 
iLEE1, the observations from iLEE2 is just a sample of the participants in iLEE1, and thus, 
the results should not differ drastically.  
 
5.1.3 Intelligence Quotient 
In table 3, we present the average IQ scores received by the participants. We also examine 
the differences in gender, age and education. 
 
                                               
9
 Two-sample t-tests have been performed with Stata 13.0. Degrees of freedom in parentheses. This goes for all 
the following tests if no other information is given. 
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Table 3 
Average IQ scores from the I-S-T 2000 R test and t-values 
Total Gender Age Education 
 Men Women 18-29 30-60 61-80 Basic 
High 
school 
Short 
Uni 
Long 
Uni 
8.688 
(3.124) 
8.654 
(3.185) 
8.724 
(3.060) 
10.397 
(2.957) 
8.847 
(2.949) 
6.690 
(2.860) 
7.889 
(3.423) 
8.825 
(3.226) 
8.640 
(3.035) 
9.109 
(2.930) 
 t(2289) = -0.537 
t(1879) =  
-8.716*** 
t(1954) = 
13.251*** 
t(819) = 
3.728*** 
t(1652)= 
1.156 
t(1468) =  
-2.647*** 
Notes: Average IQ scores with standard deviations in parenthesis from the iLEE1. t-test results presented below 
the measures tested. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
There are no significant differences in IQ scores between men and women. We found that 
the elders scored significantly lower on the IQ test than the participants in the middle-age 
group. We also found that the group of young participants scored significantly higher than the 
middle-age group. Furthermore, we found that basic educated individuals scored significantly 
lower than high school educated ones, and individuals with a long education at the university 
scored higher than those with a shorter education at the university. We did not find any 
difference in IQ scores between high school educated individuals and those with a short 
education at the university. 
 
5.1.4 Decision making 
In the decision making gambles, the participants are supposed to choose between a series 
of safe and relatively risky lotteries. They are faced with several situations, and each situation 
has a risky lottery where the expected outcome increases for each situation (see section 4.2.4 
for details). The average shift point, where the participants switch from the safe to the risky 
lottery, is presented in table 4. As can be observed, for the risk aversion gamble, the average 
risk preference seems to be risk averse (the average switch is made after the risk neutral shift 
point), in contrast to the loss aversion gamble, where it is risk seeking (the average switch is 
made before the risk neutral shift point). 
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Table 4 
Average shift points 
Risk aversion Loss aversion 
iLEE1 iLEE2 iLEE1 iLEE2 
5.172 (1.966) 6.633 (1.839) 3.298 (1.353) 8.072 (1.191) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
Table 5 
Results from two-sample t-tests with rational and irrational participants 
  Mean t-value p-value 
iLEE1     
CR score 
Rational 
Irrational 
1.713 
1.189 
11.683 0.000 
IQ score 
Rational 
Irrational 
9.257 
8.012 
9.693 0.000 
iLEE2     
CR score 
Rational 
Irrational 
1.683 
1.235 
7.477 0.000 
IQ score 
Rational 
Irrational 
9.438 
7.810 
9.366 0.000 
 
Many participants have behaved irrationally when playing the decision making gambles. 
That is, they have once or more switched back from the risky choice to choosing the safe 
lottery again, which does not make any sense, as for each lottery, the expected return of the 
risky lottery gets higher and higher in relation to the safe lottery. Or, they have not made a 
switch at all, that is, they have chosen the safe or the risky lottery at all times. These 
individuals may not have understood the game, not have made enough effort or been doing it 
on purpose. One interesting finding is that those who are irrational within gambles, have 
significant lower CR and IQ scores than participants who are rational in their choices. The 
results of these findings are presented in table 5. For the analysis of decision making, the 
irrational participants have been dropped, in order to obtain more accurate results.  
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5.1.5 Public good and dictator game 
Table 6 presents the average amount of money the participants chose to share with the 
group (public good, give and hypo groups) or take for themselves (dictator game and public 
good, take group). 
 
Table 6 
Average amounts of money  
Public good Dictator 
Give Hypo Take  
34.862 (14.760) 28.504 (14.453) 35.507 (17.346) 99.168 (32.795) 
Notes: Average shares of money (DKK) taken or given by the participants. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
We can conclude that participants in the hypo group gave less than the participants in the 
give group. This can possibly be due to the fact that the participants in the hypo group got the 
instructions of not getting paid, and therefore did not perform the task as carefully as the other 
groups, who did get paid.  
 
5.1.6 Decision time 
Table 7 presents the average times spent on each game performed. It is however 
noteworthy that we have dropped some of the data that we considered too extreme to be 
realistic. Most likely, some participants have forgotten about time, forgot that they had not 
finished or maybe got a phone call during the task (or similar). This has resulted in some of 
these values to be extremely large, so we decided to drop them. A sensitivity analysis has 
been conducted, to ensure that our chosen drop points are valid. This is explained further in 
section 5.4 and presented in appendix 2. 
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Table 7 
Average decision times 
iLEE1 iLEE2 
Decision making Public good Decision making Dictator 
Risk 
aversion 
Loss 
aversion  
 Risk 
aversion 
Loss 
aversion  
 
59079.07 
(18762.81) 
65000.64 
(22641.57) 
24120.5 
(9826.017) 
54893.67 
(18845.54) 
52532.39 
(20099.6) 
32371.12 
(15887.56) 
  Free rider Cooperative   Fair Selfish 
  
22197.53 
(9865.875) 
22031.87 
(9096.208) 
  
29806.93 
(15421.48) 
33548.87 
(15691.11) 
Notes: Time measured in hundredths of seconds (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
5.2 Method & results 
In this section we will present the method and findings from our analyses. First, the effects 
of CR and IQ on the different outcomes in the games will be presented, in order to get an 
overview of how these interact. Thereafter, our main analysis, the decision time analysis, is 
presented. The regressions marked in grey have significant CR and/or IQ score coefficients. 
This section merely presents the analysis, however, all results will be discussed in detail in 
section 6. 
Most of our regressions are made with the classical ordinary least square (OLS) method, 
which is a method frequently used when examining relationships between variables. It 
basically calculates a predicted line that is fitted to the observations, minimizing the distance 
between this line and all observations, hence the name least squares. In a model with only one 
regressor, the slope of the line will correspond to the impact of the independent variable on 
the dependent variable (Verbeek, 2012). It is a powerful method, due to its properties, and, 
thus, we find it to be a suitable method to use for analysis in this study. 
For the analysis of the public good and dictator game, the probit model is used. It is a 
regression for binary dependent variables, that is, dependent variables that only take the 
values 1 or 0, which corresponds to a specific event to happen or not. The regression then 
calculates how the independent variable affects the probability of the dependent variable to 
take on the value 1. However, the interpretation of the coefficients is not as straightforward as 
for the OLS model, and thus, the marginal effects must be calculated separately. The sign of 
the coefficients obtained can be interpreted normally (Verbeek, 2012). In our analysis, we 
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study four different possible situations, and thus, a probit model seems to be the most 
appropriate model to use. 
In the following sections, the regressions used for the analysis are illustrated and 
explained. The results from these regressions are presented after each methodological 
description. In all of the regressions below, the variables of interest is the CR score and IQ 
score. These are independent variables and we examine them and their effect in the different 
situations. The dependent variable will differ. One thing to note is that we do not aim to 
explain the dependent variable as one would normally do when performing a regression. We 
simply want to find the relation between our variables of interest (CR and IQ scores) and 
these different situations, and more specifically how these variables of interest differ from 
each other in the same situation.  
We have included various control variables in the regressions that we believe might have 
an impact on the variation in the dependent variable. The ones that occur in all regressions 
below are age, education, gender and personality. The first three mentioned are dummy 
variables in our regressions, allowing for non-linear relations. Age is grouped into young (18-
30), youngmiddle (31-45), middleold (46-60) (omitted) and old (61-80). Education is grouped 
into basicedu (omitted), which are the participants who only have finished pre high school 
education, highschool, which are the participants who have finished high school but no more, 
shortuni, are participants with university studies up to three years, and longuni, are those who 
have studied at the university for more than three years. Gender is grouped into males 
(omitted) and females, where the sex variable represents females. In section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 
we also include a dummy variable, which indicates to what group the participants belong for 
the public good game (see section 4.2.5).  
All regressions and calculations were made in Stata 13.0. 
 
5.2.1 Decision making 
In this section, we seek to find the relation between cognitive ability, in form of CR and 
IQ, and risky decision making. We will illustrate four regressions in this section, 1) CR and 
risky decisions excluding losses, 2) IQ and risky decisions excluding losses, 3) CR and risky 
decisions including losses, and 4) IQ and risky decisions including losses. The first two will 
capture risk aversion while the second two aim to capture loss aversion (see section 3.5). The 
regressions are OLS with robust standard errors due to some detection of heteroskedasticity. 
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1) OLS regression for risk aversion and CR score: 
 
shiftpointrisk = constant + ß1crscore + ß2big5a + ß3big5c + ß4big5e + ß5big5n + ß6big5o + 
ß7sex + ß8highschool + ß9shortuni + ß10longuni + ß11young + ß12youngmiddle + ß13old 
 
where shiftpointrisk is the point where the participants choose the risky lottery in the risk 
aversion gamble, crscore is the score from the CRT, big5a is the result from the big five test 
concerning agreeableness, big5c is the result from the big five test concerning consciousness, 
big5e is the result from the big five test concerning extraversion, big5n is the result from the 
big five test concerning neuroticism, big5o is the result from the big five test concerning 
openness and sex, highschool, shortuni, longuni, young, youngmiddle and old are dummy 
variables, representing gender, education and age differences. 
 
2) OLS regression for risk aversion and IQ score: 
 
shiftpointrisk = constant + ß1iqscore + ß2big5a + ß3big5c + ß4big5e + ß5big5n + ß6big5o + 
ß7sex +ß8highschool + ß9shortuni + ß10longuni + ß11young + ß12youngmiddle + ß13old 
 
where iqscore is the score from the IQ test (I-S-T 2000 R). 
 
3) OLS regression for loss aversion and CR: 
 
shiftpointloss = constant + ß1crscore + ß2big5a + ß3big5c + ß4big5e + ß5big5n + ß6big5o + 
ß7sex +  ß8highschool + ß9shortuni + ß10longuni + ß11young + ß12youngmiddle + ß13old 
 
where shiftpointloss represents the point where the participants choose the risky lottery in the 
loss aversion gamble. 
 
4) OLS regression for loss aversion and IQ: 
 
shiftpointloss = constant + ß1iqscore + ß2big5a + ß3big5c + ß4big5e + ß5big5n + ß6big5o + 
ß7sex + ß8highschool + ß9shortuni + ß10longuni + ß11young + ß12youngmiddle + ß13old 
 
We also conducted a two sample t-test to map the difference in the average shift point 
between the participants with low (0-1) and high (2-3) CR scores, first of all, to see whether 
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the participants with high CR differ in risk and loss aversion, but also to be able to combine it 
with the efficiency discussion. The same was done for low (0-10) and high (11-20) IQ scores, 
since the average IQ of the population in general is around 100 (corresponding to a score of 
9.6) (see section 3.2), we found it reasonable to separate low and high IQ at score 10. 
 
Table 8 
Regressions of risk aversion gamble decision switch point 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CR 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE2 
CR 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
         crscore -0.319*** -0.288*** 
  
0.128** 0.124** 
  
 
(0.046) (0.048) 
  
(0.057) (0.059) 
  
big5a 
 
0.037*** 
 
0.037*** 
 
0.012 
 
0.012 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
big5c 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.005 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
big5e 
 
0.013 
 
0.016* 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.015 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
big5n 
 
0.023*** 
 
0.027*** 
 
0.007 
 
0.004 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
big5o 
 
0.012 
 
0.009 
 
0.018 
 
0.020* 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
young 
 
-0.394*** 
 
-0.311** 
 
0.373** 
 
0.269 
  
(0.146) 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.177) 
 
(0.179) 
youngmiddle 
 
-0.096 
 
-0.039 
 
0.336** 
 
0.264* 
  
(0.132) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.159) 
old 
 
-0.512*** 
 
-0.520*** 
 
-0.263 
 
-0.214 
  
(0.182) 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.224) 
 
(0.225) 
sex 
 
0.059 
 
0.164 
 
-0.095 
 
-0.127 
  
(0.117) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.140) 
highschool 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.040 
 
0.687*** 
 
0.702*** 
  
(0.188) 
 
(0.190) 
 
(0.264) 
 
(0.262) 
shortuni 
 
-0.261 
 
-0.281 
 
0.511** 
 
0.524** 
  
(0.180) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.256) 
longuni 
 
-0.306 
 
-0.403* 
 
0.449 
 
0.495* 
  
(0.205) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.278) 
 
(0.277) 
iqscore 
  
-0.036** -0.041** 
  
0.070*** 0.055** 
   
(0.017) (0.018) 
  
(0.022) (0.023) 
Constant 5.699*** 3.913*** 5.502*** 3.574*** 6.420*** 5.140*** 5.971*** 5.031*** 
 
(0.093) (0.605) (0.171) (0.622) (0.124) (0.786) (0.230) (0.815) 
         Observations 1,399 1,399 1,399 1,399 856 856 856 856 
R-squared 0.031 0.065 0.003 0.045 0.006 0.036 0.013 0.038 
Notes: OLS regression with CR and IQ scores respectively on decision making, covering risk aversion with data 
from both iLEE1 (1-4) and iLEE2 (5-8). Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 8 presents the results from an OLS regression between CR and IQ scores 
respectively, on the risk aversion gamble. In regression (1), (3), (5), and (7) the scores are 
regressed on the decision independently. The other regressions also include control variables 
(see section 5.1.1 for details). The main findings suggest that higher CR and IQ scores, 
significantly lower the shift point, that is, the participants who score high on the CRT and/or 
the IQ test will choose the risky lottery over the safe one earlier in the gamble than those with 
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lower scores. This implies that they are less risk averse, because they choose the risky lottery 
when the expected outcome is lower than for the lottery which participants with lower scores 
choose. This result is especially strong for the CR score. However, we only find this relation 
for the test done in iLEE1. The opposite result is found for iLEE2, where both CR and IQ 
significantly increase the shift points. Some personality traits, age and education influence 
these choices as well. 
The average shift point for participants with high CR scores (2-3) is 4.900, which differs 
significantly from the average of those with low scores (0-1), which is 5.526, t(1397) = 5.980 
(p-value =0.000). We did not find any significant differences in shift point for participants 
with high (11-20) (average 5.081) and low (0-10) (average 5.218) IQ scores respectively, 
t(1397) = 1.233 (p-value =0.218). These results concern the iLEE1. 
 
Table 9 
Regressions of loss aversion gamble decision switch point 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CR 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE2 
CR 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
         crscore -0.091*** -0.077*** 
  
0.105*** 0.098*** 
  
 
(0.029) (0.030) 
  
(0.024) (0.025) 
  
big5a 
 
0.011* 
 
0.011* 
 
0.001 
 
-0.000 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
big5c 
 
0.007 
 
0.008 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
big5e 
 
0.009 
 
0.010 
 
0.002 
 
0.000 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
big5n 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.018*** 
 
0.008* 
 
0.007 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
big5o 
 
0.013** 
 
0.013** 
 
0.003 
 
0.004 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
young 
 
0.121 
 
0.164 
 
0.115* 
 
0.118* 
  
(0.102) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.068) 
youngmiddle 
 
0.018 
 
0.051 
 
0.085 
 
0.084 
  
(0.079) 
 
(0.080) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.062) 
old 
 
-0.061 
 
-0.071 
 
-0.077 
 
-0.074 
  
(0.096) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.080) 
sex 
 
-0.006 
 
0.021 
 
-0.111* 
 
-0.150*** 
  
(0.073) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.057) 
highschool 
 
0.018 
 
0.022 
 
0.037 
 
0.048 
  
(0.123) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.103) 
shortuni 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.002 
 
0.021 
  
(0.117) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.101) 
longuni 
 
-0.125 
 
-0.148 
 
0.036 
 
0.080 
  
(0.133) 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.110) 
iqscore 
  
-0.010 -0.021* 
  
0.012 0.003 
   
(0.010) (0.011) 
  
(0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 3.443*** 1.872*** 3.391*** 1.852*** 7.480*** 7.248*** 7.541*** 7.422*** 
 
(0.057) (0.401) (0.099) (0.404) (0.052) (0.303) (0.077) (0.308) 
         Observations 1,791 1,791 1,791 1,791 1,132 1,132 1,132 1,132 
R-squared 0.005 0.023 0.001 0.021 0.018 0.034 0.002 0.019 
Notes: OLS regression with CR and IQ scores respectively on decision making, covering loss aversion with data  
from both iLEE1 (1-4) and iLEE2 (5-8). Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 presents the results from an OLS regression between CR and IQ scores 
respectively, on the loss aversion gamble. In regression (1), (3), (5), and (7) the scores are 
regressed on the decision independently. The other regressions also include control variables. 
This gamble differs from the risk aversion gamble, as it is possible to make losses. This, of 
course, will affect the choice. Again, we find that a higher CR and/or IQ score relates to an 
earlier shift point, indicating less loss aversion. However, on the contrary, a high CR score 
will delay the choice in the iLEE2, that is, these participants will choose the risky lottery later 
in the gamble than participants with lower scores. We can still see that personality has a role 
in this, but we also find a gender difference, where females actually tend to choose the risky 
lottery earlier in the gamble than men, however only for the iLEE2. 
We found that individuals with high CR scores had a significantly lower shift point 
(average 3.225) than individuals with low CR scores (average 3.385), t(1789) = 2.498 (p-
value =0.013). The same result was found for high (average 3.190) and low (3.348) IQ scores, 
t(1789) = 2.305 (p-value =0.021). These results concern the iLEE1. 
In section 5.1.4, we discuss rationality within the gambles in the risk and the loss aversion 
gambles. We define rationality as not switching back from a risky to a safe lottery, once the 
first switch from the safe to the risky lottery has been made. The reason for this is, as 
mentioned, the fact that the risky lottery will get more attractive for every new lottery choice, 
that is, at lottery 1, the risky lottery will have the lowest expected outcome in relation to the 
safe lottery, so once a switch has been made, it would be unreasonable to switch back again. 
We have established that this kind of rational individuals, has significantly higher cognitive 
ability.  
Furthermore, we also examined consistency between gambles, that is, individuals having 
the same risk preferences in both iLEE1 and iLEE2. For example, if an individual has been 
risk averse (chosen to switch after the risk neutral shift point) in iLEE1 as well as in iLEE2, 
he/she is consistent between gambles. A majority of individuals participating in both iLEE1 
and iLEE2 have been consistent. Of course, we only examine the individuals who have been 
rational within both gambles, because otherwise, we assume that they have not understood the 
task or have not made a real effort (as described in section 5.1.4). Consequently, we found 
that consistent individuals exhibit significantly higher cognitive ability (average CR = 1.937 
and IQ = 9.935), both in form of CR and IQ, than inconsistent individuals (average CR = 
1.661 and IQ = 9.301), t(604) = -3.172 (p-value =0.002) for CR and t(604) = -2.597 (p-value 
= 0.010) for IQ. 
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 Furthermore, we have examined the individuals that presented an optimal behaviour, i.e. 
those who have been rational, consistent AND risk neutral in their choices, that is, those who 
have maximized expected outcome, and hence, their utility. These individuals have an 
astonishing average CR of 2.360 compared to risk seeking or risk averse individuals (1.808), 
which is significantly higher, t(365) = -4.445 (p-value = 0.000). They also exhibit a 
significantly higher IQ (10.477 compared to 9.767), t(365) = -2.051 (p-value = 0.041). 
 
5.2.2 Public good and dictator games 
This section holds two different dependent variables, the amount of money shared in the 
public good game and the dictator game respectively. This section will hold four probit 
regressions; 1) CR and public good choice, 2) IQ and public good choice, 3) CR and dictator 
choice, and 4) IQ and dictator choice. 
For the public good game, we examine two situations; a) the probability of the participant 
being a free rider, that is, keeping everything for him-/herself, and b) the probability of the 
participant being cooperative, that is, contributing everything to the common pot. 
 
1) Probit regression for public good game and CR score: 
 
situation a or b = constant + ß1crscore + ß2big5a + ß3big5c + ß4big5e + ß5big5n + ß6big5o 
+ ß7sex + ß8highschool + ß9shortuni + ß10longuni + ß11young + ß12youngmiddle + ß13old + 
ß14hypothetical + ß15take 
 
where situation a or b, is a binary variable, that is it can only take the value 1 or 0, and a or b 
are the situations described above, and the variables hypothetical, give (omitted) and take are 
dummy variables which represent the different tasks the individuals are grouped into. 
 
2) Probit regression for public good game and IQ score: 
 
situation a or b = constant + ß1iqscore + ß2big5a + ß3big5c + ß4big5e + ß5big5n + ß6big5o 
+ ß7sex + ß8highschool + ß9shortuni + ß10longuni + ß11young + ß12youngmiddle + ß13old + 
ß14hypothetical + ß15take 
 
For the dictator game, we examine two situations; c) the probability of the participant 
being a fair, that is, giving half of the money to the other player, and d) the probability of the 
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participant being selfish, that is, taking the all money for him-/herself, leaving the passive 
participant with nothing. 
 
3) Probit regression for dictator game and CR score: 
 
situation c or d = constant + ß1crscore + ß2big5a + ß3big5c + ß4big5e + ß5big5n + ß6big5o 
+ ß7highschool + ß8shortuni + ß9longuni + ß10young + ß11youngmiddle + ß12old  
 
where situation c or d, is a binary variable, that is it can only take the value 1 or 0, and c or d 
are the situations described above 
 
4) Probit regression for dictator game and IQ score: 
 
situation c or d = constant + ß1iqscore + ß2big5a + ß3big5c + ß4big5e + ß5big5n + ß6big5o 
+ ß7highschool + ß8shortuni + ß9longuni + ß10young + ß11youngmiddle + ß12old 
 
Table 10 presents the results from the public good game probit regressions in two 
different situations. The free rider (1-4) is a participant who keeps all money to him-/herself 
and does not share anything with the common pot. The second situation, cooperative (5-8), is 
where the participant puts all their initial money in the common pot. We have regressed CR 
and IQ scores on the probability of one of these situations happening. Regressions with even 
numbers have control variables included. Keep in mind that these coefficients cannot be 
interpreted as numbers, but only as signs of directions. The marginal effects can be found in 
section 5.3.  
We find a relation between high CR and being a free rider, that is, scoring high on the 
CRT will increase the probability of free riding in the public good game. We do not observe 
this relation with IQ at all. A high score on the CRT will also increase the probability of being 
cooperative, however, we only find this in the regression without the control variables. IQ 
does not affect this situation significantly either. 
Several control variables have an impact on the regression, as seen in table 10. For the 
free rider situation, which is the only situation where CR has an impact when the control 
variables are included, we can see the following (regression 6): First of all, some personality 
traits affect this choice. Agreeableness (big5a) significantly lowers the probability of being a 
free rider, while conscientiousness (big5c) significantly increases this probability. 
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Furthermore, the young (18-30) and the old (61-80) seem to have a higher probability of free 
riding in the public good game, compared to the middle-old participants (46-60). We can also 
see an educational effect, where participants with a long college education tend to be free 
riders with a higher probability than those who have not. Also, we can see that those in the 
take group tend to free ride more. 
 
Table 10 
Regressions of public good game money distribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Free 
rider CR 
Free 
rider CR 
Free 
rider IQ 
Free 
rider IQ 
Cooperative 
CR 
Cooperative 
CR 
Cooperative 
IQ 
Cooperative 
IQ 
            
 
    
crscore 0.111*** 0.084*     0.059** 0.017     
  (0.040) (0.044)     (0.024) (0.026)     
big5a   -0.037***   -0.037***   0.012**   0.012** 
    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
big5c   0.016*   0.016*   -0.012**   -0.012** 
    (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
big5e   -0.008   -0.009   0.005   0.005 
    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
big5n   0.004   0.003   -0.011**   -0.012** 
    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
big5o   -0.013   -0.012   0.007   0.007 
    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
young   0.352***   0.351***   -0.230***   -0.232** 
    (0.128)   (0.130)   (0.088)   (0.090) 
youngmiddle   -0.100   -0.098   0.065   0.062 
    (0.118)   (0.120)   (0.068)   (0.069) 
old   0.212*   0.202   -0.036   -0.038 
    (0.125)   (0.127)   (0.079)   (0.080) 
sex   -0.158   -0.187*   -0.223***   -0.229*** 
    (0.101)   (0.099)   (0.060)   (0.060) 
highschool   0.060   0.066   0.125   0.127 
    (0.173)   (0.172)   (0.102)   (0.102) 
shortuni   0.159   0.176   0.135   0.138 
    (0.164)   (0.163)   (0.096)   (0.096) 
longuni   0.321*   0.372**   0.352***   0.361*** 
    (0.181)   (0.179)   (0.111)   (0.110) 
hypo   0.234   0.227   -0.534***   -0.535*** 
    (0.195)   (0.194)   (0.137)   (0.137) 
take   0.395***   0.393***   0.359***   0.359*** 
    (0.091)   (0.091)   (0.059)   (0.059) 
iqscore     0.008 0.002     0.001 0.001 
      (0.013) (0.015)     (0.008) (0.009) 
Constant -1.750*** -0.907* -1.648*** -0.749 -0.336*** -0.510 -0.260*** -0.486 
  (0.078) (0.536) (0.123) (0.545) (0.045) (0.345) (0.078) (0.347) 
                  
Observations 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 
Notes: Probit regression with CR and IQ score respectively on the share of money (DKK) given to (or taken from) the 
common pot in the public good game. Regression 1-4 is the probability of the participant being a free rider. Regression 
5-8 is the probability of the participant of being cooperative. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11 presents the results from the dictator game probit regressions in two different 
situations. The fair situation (1-4), is where the participants share half of the money he/she 
originally has with the other player. The selfish (5-8) is a participant who keeps all money to 
him-/herself and does not share anything with the other player. We have regressed CR and IQ 
scores on the probability of one of these situations happening. Regressions with even numbers 
have control variables included. Keep in mind that these coefficients cannot be interpreted as 
numbers, but only as signs of directions. The marginal effects can be found in section 5.3. 
 
Table 11 
Regressions of dictator game money distribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Fair 
CR 
Fair 
CR 
Fair 
IQ 
Fair 
IQ 
Selfish 
CR 
Selfish 
CR 
Selfish 
IQ 
Selfish 
IQ 
         crscore -0.099*** -0.099*** 
  
0.219*** 0.201*** 
  
 
(0.031) (0.033) 
  
(0.035) (0.037) 
  
big5a 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.022*** 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
big5c 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.006 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
big5e 
 
-0.016** 
 
-0.014** 
 
0.009 
 
0.004 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
big5n 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.010 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
big5o 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.020*** 
 
-0.016** 
 
-0.014** 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
young 
 
-0.516*** 
 
-0.491*** 
 
0.513*** 
 
0.383*** 
  
(0.111) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.118) 
youngmiddle 
 
-0.234*** 
 
-0.212** 
 
0.284*** 
 
0.185* 
  
(0.090) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.099) 
old 
 
0.100 
 
0.094 
 
-0.168 
 
-0.100 
  
(0.097) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.117) 
sex 
 
-0.011 
 
0.029 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.105 
  
(0.079) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.086) 
highschool 
 
0.071 
 
0.062 
 
0.146 
 
0.182 
  
(0.132) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.154) 
shortuni 
 
0.035 
 
0.021 
 
0.219 
 
0.254* 
  
(0.123) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.147) 
longuni
10
 
 
-0.075 
 
-0.119 
 
0.470*** 
 
0.557*** 
  
(0.143) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.163) 
iqscore 
  
-0.040*** -0.014 
  
0.088*** 0.066*** 
   
(0.011) (0.012) 
  
(0.012) (0.013) 
Constant 0.181*** -0.198 0.381*** -0.286 -1.029*** -0.217 -1.483*** -0.259 
 
(0.059) (0.456) (0.101) (0.457) (0.069) (0.489) (0.117) (0.498) 
         Observations 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 
Notes: Probit regression with CR and IQ score respectively on the share of money (DKK) taken to keep in the 
dictator game. Regression 1-4 is the probability of the participant to choose to be fair. Regression 5-8 is the 
probability of the participant being selfish. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                               
10 No data for the generous situation (regression 9-12) because there are no generous participants with a long 
university education in the dataset. 
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The dictator game differs from the public good game because it is a game between two 
individuals (compared to the public good game where four players are involved), where one 
participant has all the power. Therefore, we also expect the results to differ, and as we can 
observe, they do. First of all, cognitive ability seems to have a greater impact on these specific 
situations overall in the dictator game, seeing that we have much more significance present. 
Scoring high on the CRT decreases the probability of being fair, and increases the probability 
of being selfish. We find similar results for participants with high IQ scores. A high score 
decreases the probability of being fair, however, only when no controls are present, and it 
increases the probability of being selfish.  
As for the controls, we can again observe that agreeableness (big5a) has a positive impact 
on both the fair and the selfish situation, that is, high agreeableness scores are related to 
higher probabilities of these particular situations happening. Extraversion (big5e) has a 
negative impact on the fair situation, while it does not affect the other situations significantly. 
Openness affects the fair situations positively, but the selfish situation negatively. Age 
matters, the younger groups (18-45) have lower probability than the older of being fair, but 
higher probabilities of being selfish. We also observe an educational effect, where the 
participants with a long university education have a higher probability of being selfish. 
 
5.2.3 Time analysis 
In this section we examine the relation between cognitive ability and the time spent on 
performing the different tasks in this study (decision making, public good and dictator game), 
and in particular, we are interested in the difference between CR and IQ. Again, we only seek 
to find relations between cognitive ability and response time, not causal effects. Basically we 
have done the exact same regressions as above, that is we include the same control variables 
and independent variables (not probit, see appendix 3 for public good and dictator games), but 
we have replaced the dependent variable with the time it took to perform that specific task 
(e.g. shiftpointrisk is replaced with the time it took for the participant to make his/her risky 
choice in the risk aversion gamble).  
We have chosen to remove some extreme observations (very long time compared to 
average), as we fear that these are participants who might have left the screen on by accident 
or by sloppiness. We have done this to get a fairer picture of the relationship between the 
response time and cognitive ability. However, we have performed a sensitivity analysis of the 
cutting points in our data, to make sure that these points are appropriate and do not change the 
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results remarkably. See section 5.4 for a detailed description of this analysis. Each cut off 
point is also presented in the table notes as they differ for every regression. 
Table 12 holds the results from the OLS regressions with CR and IQ scores respectively 
on the time spent on making decisions in the risk aversion gamble. The table holds data from 
both iLEE1 and iLEE2. 
 
Table 12 
Regressions of decision time for risk aversion gamble 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CR 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE2 
CR 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
         crscore 1,902.993*** 1,975.814*** 
  
541.730 637.644 
  
 
(511.641) (507.047) 
  
(621.805) (604.525) 
  
big5a 
 
295.152*** 
 
304.009*** 
 
217.138* 
 
208.229* 
  
(98.449) 
 
(99.673) 
 
(117.198) 
 
(116.052) 
big5c 
 
149.363 
 
160.616 
 
28.677 
 
38.977 
  
(111.743) 
 
(112.516) 
 
(132.449) 
 
(131.490) 
big5e 
 
-201.687** 
 
-233.402** 
 
-79.724 
 
-61.022 
  
(100.803) 
 
(100.763) 
 
(127.766) 
 
(127.478) 
big5n 
 
-74.455 
 
-108.567 
 
125.411 
 
139.818 
  
(98.367) 
 
(98.258) 
 
(102.019) 
 
(101.562) 
big5o 
 
276.921*** 
 
307.591*** 
 
20.616 
 
27.108 
  
(93.277) 
 
(93.975) 
 
(109.452) 
 
(110.184) 
young 
 
-9,012.108*** 
 
-7,982.205*** 
 
-12,364.847*** 
 
-11,297.053*** 
  
(1,678.986) 
 
(1,779.012) 
 
(1,755.823) 
 
(1,785.017) 
youngmiddle 
 
-6,910.657*** 
 
-6,352.171*** 
 
-7,807.441*** 
 
-7,005.954*** 
  
(1,381.032) 
 
(1,402.911) 
 
(1,604.888) 
 
(1,605.835) 
old 
 
5,436.038*** 
 
4,730.835** 
 
12,040.209*** 
 
11,802.227*** 
  
(1,889.010) 
 
(1,868.949) 
 
(2,331.913) 
 
(2,331.020) 
sex 
 
400.566 
 
-446.753 
 
-123.303 
 
-621.630 
  
(1,230.874) 
 
(1,209.723) 
 
(1,397.776) 
 
(1,368.866) 
highschool 
 
77.567 
 
202.566 
 
1,750.789 
 
1,510.618 
  
(2,139.704) 
 
(2,169.100) 
 
(2,430.056) 
 
(2,441.693) 
shortuni 
 
529.019 
 
700.669 
 
2,500.110 
 
2,444.551 
  
(2,147.781) 
 
(2,176.661) 
 
(2,367.473) 
 
(2,374.459) 
longuni 
 
-2,010.363 
 
-938.310 
 
1,481.913 
 
1,619.568 
  
(2,386.125) 
 
(2,402.794) 
 
(2,665.705) 
 
(2,641.476) 
iqscore 
  
-838.762*** -397.470** 
  
-1,236.110*** -539.247** 
   
(189.855) (192.835) 
  
(224.333) (221.059) 
Constant 55,960.947*** 45,635.246*** 66,809.166*** 52,330.875*** 53,689.597*** 47,549.543*** 66,478.516*** 52,518.145*** 
 
(974.805) (6,803.715) (1,902.287) (7,057.213) (1,235.243) (8,299.851) (2,313.571) (8,300.085) 
         Observations 1,072 1,072 1,072 1,072 738 738 738 738 
R-squared 
0.013 0.117 0.019 0.108 0.001 0.175 0.041 0.180 
         Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the decision making gamble covering risk 
aversion (no losses possible). Data from iLEE1 (1-4) and iLEE2 (5-8). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cut off point: 
100,000 for iLEE1 and iLEE2. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These regressions show that there is a rather huge difference between CR and IQ when 
examining the time spent on a decision making task. A higher CR score increases the time 
spent on this task significantly, while a high IQ score does the exact opposite, it decreases the 
45 
 
decision time. For the iLEE2 we could only find a significant (negative) relation for IQ 
scores. 
Table 13 holds the results from the OLS regressions with CR and IQ scores respectively 
on the time spent on making decisions in the loss aversion gamble. The table holds data from 
both iLEE1 and iLEE2. 
 
Table 13 
Regressions of decision time for loss aversion gamble 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CR 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE2 
CR 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
         crscore 3,083.595*** 2,918.842*** 
  
1,642.158*** 1,618.350*** 
  
 
(506.836) (518.791) 
  
(575.070) (573.233) 
  
big5a 
 
200.752** 
 
195.587* 
 
-94.068 
 
-114.395 
  
(100.950) 
 
(102.799) 
 
(118.952) 
 
(119.294) 
big5c 
 
232.667** 
 
221.532* 
 
134.092 
 
145.829 
  
(113.640) 
 
(114.010) 
 
(114.595) 
 
(114.838) 
big5e 
 
-203.074** 
 
-237.303** 
 
-61.341 
 
-74.192 
  
(102.995) 
 
(103.587) 
 
(107.769) 
 
(107.403) 
big5n 
 
-20.530 
 
-59.262 
 
-202.356* 
 
-216.845** 
  
(99.267) 
 
(100.206) 
 
(104.576) 
 
(105.396) 
big5o 
 
271.012*** 
 
316.617*** 
 
62.341 
 
97.190 
  
(97.238) 
 
(98.180) 
 
(99.550) 
 
(100.335) 
young 
 
-5,007.527*** 
 
-4,581.210** 
 
-10,848.703*** 
 
-10,059.452*** 
  
(1,713.591) 
 
(1,795.512) 
 
(1,715.424) 
 
(1,761.718) 
youngmiddle 
 
-4,396.224*** 
 
-4,375.232*** 
 
-5,609.881*** 
 
-5,155.708*** 
  
(1,391.895) 
 
(1,427.600) 
 
(1,531.121) 
 
(1,578.632) 
old 
 
4,720.277*** 
 
4,032.086** 
 
8,496.478*** 
 
8,088.809*** 
  
(1,787.300) 
 
(1,800.096) 
 
(1,945.498) 
 
(1,964.062) 
sex 
 
-1,257.634 
 
-2,283.196* 
 
1,285.491 
 
543.046 
  
(1,238.609) 
 
(1,239.846) 
 
(1,356.666) 
 
(1,337.609) 
highschool 
 
603.479 
 
814.017 
 
4,324.535* 
 
4,482.771* 
  
(2,251.839) 
 
(2,307.306) 
 
(2,300.814) 
 
(2,321.957) 
shortuni 
 
2,346.588 
 
2,914.256 
 
4,330.248** 
 
4,714.986** 
  
(2,141.206) 
 
(2,188.461) 
 
(2,201.297) 
 
(2,220.441) 
longuni 
 
1,768.573 
 
3,463.729 
 
2,702.848 
 
3,345.879 
  
(2,493.944) 
 
(2,505.698) 
 
(2,453.822) 
 
(2,470.240) 
iqscore 
  
-444.369** -100.169 
  
-901.119*** -278.068 
   
(184.970) (196.543) 
  
(194.669) (200.942) 
Constant 60,054.645*** 46,223.673*** 68,908.885*** 52,655.113*** 49,649.256*** 50,637.910*** 60,485.627*** 55,489.627*** 
 
(973.476) (7,140.969) (1,812.045) (7,320.002) (1,093.606) (7,713.083) (1,962.375) (7,719.936) 
         Observations 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 981 981 981 981 
R-squared 
0.023 0.066 0.004 0.047 0.008 0.116 0.021 0.111 
         Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the decision making gamble covering loss 
aversion (losses possible). Data from iLEE1 (1-4) and iLEE2 (5-8). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cut off point: 
120,000 for iLEE1 and 100,000 for iLEE2. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The regressions above basically only give significant results for the CR analyses. We see 
that a higher CR score in fact will increase the time spent on the task. We can observe one 
significant result for the IQ analysis, however, this is without control variables present. The 
relation is negative, that is, a higher IQ score decreases the time spent on the loss aversion 
46 
 
gamble. The most relevant control here is age, and we can clearly observe that the younger 
groups (18-45) are faster than the older groups. These results hold for both iLEE1 and iLEE2. 
 
Table 14 
Regressions of decision time for public good and dictator games 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES CR PG CR PG IQ PG IQ PG CR D CR D IQ D IQ D 
                  
crscore -412.874* -180.636     -550.237 -220.054     
  (214.852) (213.302)     (438.165) (451.475)     
big5a   95.528**   96.756**   108.884   106.119 
    (44.433)   (44.391)   (85.122)   (84.784) 
big5c   70.718   75.327   8.535   17.334 
    (45.888)   (46.107)   (88.959)   (88.300) 
big5e   -12.048   -8.624   -8.498   9.673 
    (43.607)   (43.047)   (79.274)   (78.524) 
big5n   37.004   38.791   -41.666   -28.854 
    (40.884)   (40.836)   (79.446)   (78.989) 
big5o   -30.912   -26.902   -126.726*   -124.210* 
    (39.465)   (39.512)   (75.145)   (74.994) 
young   -1,685.769**   -1,110.620   -2,774.074**   -1,884.929 
    (710.965)   (725.744)   (1,405.634)   (1,419.810) 
youngmiddle   -1,863.786***   -1,485.010***   -3,091.653***   -2,455.643** 
    (536.921)   (541.066)   (1,146.047)   (1,155.040) 
old   5,502.063***   5,145.037***   5,820.852***   5,242.574*** 
    (731.344)   (732.043)   (1,309.268)   (1,325.616) 
sex   216.807   258.221   1,133.160   1,113.236 
    (500.974)   (489.609)   (1,013.867)   (979.922) 
highschool   -1,366.577*   -1,374.897*   -1,612.409   -1,566.091 
    (819.806)   (816.649)   (1,674.783)   (1,677.726) 
shortuni   -1,930.742**   -1,869.930**   -4,434.066***   -4,244.447*** 
    (762.616)   (757.210)   (1,535.349)   (1,541.321) 
longuni   -1,979.460**   -1,901.913**   -3,705.367**   -3,574.743* 
    (927.513)   (916.753)   (1,835.076)   (1,826.827) 
hypo   331.985   449.628         
    (935.633)   (930.840)         
take   -345.107   -345.211         
    (501.672)   (499.814)         
iqscore     -520.046*** -260.918***     -780.625*** -424.051*** 
      (74.123) (75.949)     (148.271) (150.375) 
Constant 24,614.755*** 21,045.824*** 28,617.988*** 22,418.426*** 32,968.476*** 35,970.189*** 39,147.444*** 38,040.185*** 
  (389.219) (2,944.747) (704.529) (2,929.089) (781.755) (5,748.274) (1,437.579) (5,769.486) 
                  
Observations 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 
R-squared 0.002 0.080 0.028 0.086 0.001 0.059 0.025 0.065 
         Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the public good (1-4) and dictator games (5-
8). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cut off point: 50,000 for public good and 75,000 for dictator game. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 14 presents the results from the public good (1-4) and dictator game (5-8) analyses. 
CR and IQ scores are regressed on the time spent on deciding the amount of money to give 
(or take) to (or from) the other player(s). As the results show, CR does not have a significant 
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impact on the time spent on these tasks (except for regression 1, without controls). However, 
when we look at IQ, we observe that an increase in IQ score significantly decreases the time 
spent on both the public good game and the dictator game. As for the control variables, the 
youngmiddle group (31-45) seems to be significantly faster than other age groups, while the 
old group (61-80) seems to be significantly slower than the other age groups.  
 
Table 15 
Regression of decision time in public good game for free riders and cooperative separately 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CR 
Free rider 
CR 
Free rider 
IQ 
Free rider 
IQ 
Free rider 
CR 
Cooperative 
CR 
Cooperative 
IQ 
Cooperative 
IQ 
Cooperative 
                  
crscore -1,126.044 -1,026.311   -427.542 -249.482   
  (893.063) (1,117.474)   (296.347) (301.561)   
big5a  87.312  130.717  91.882  92.214 
   (181.392)  (183.393)  (63.518)  (63.129) 
big5c  -111.240  -114.191  38.097  49.241 
   (239.801)  (248.291)  (66.506)  (66.762) 
big5e  160.998  223.989  -41.364  -30.536 
   (190.107)  (179.998)  (64.960)  (64.185) 
big5n  506.926**  552.736**  40.598  46.559 
   (222.867)  (218.907)  (58.721)  (58.681) 
big5o  131.509  140.569  60.504  58.340 
   (170.210)  (170.206)  (55.901)  (55.613) 
young  -4,094.583  -3,690.158  -593.644  -4.286 
   (3,255.964)  (3,350.829)  (1,132.767)  (1,150.647) 
youngmiddle  -3,119.463  -3,125.616  -658.795  -295.901 
   (2,902.485)  (2,927.522)  (761.783)  (764.624) 
old  3,740.961  2,955.230  5,607.814***  5,298.738*** 
   (3,023.304)  (2,907.980)  (1,007.999)  (1,000.032) 
sex  2,363.062  1,820.975  -731.363  -636.158 
   (2,358.054)  (2,268.501)  (740.528)  (711.711) 
highschool  22.909  267.910  574.175  464.007 
   (3,715.948)  (3,435.757)  (1,172.624)  (1,159.305) 
shortuni  -2,415.216  -2,315.215  -337.766  -404.404 
   (4,109.565)  (3,728.847)  (1,047.499)  (1,032.663) 
longuni  5,070.062  4,565.637  -1,291.829  -1,297.484 
   (4,360.545)  (3,974.606)  (1,206.435)  (1,187.153) 
hypo  -3,592.741  -2,814.441  2,400.767  2,763.762 
   (5,171.852)  (5,065.328)  (1,721.398)  (1,717.692) 
take  -584.145  -468.961  -588.826  -560.688 
   (2,294.169)  (2,330.141)  (672.113)  (670.284) 
iqscore   -605.007 -244.765   -474.957*** -277.476** 
    (385.523) (396.495)   (112.794) (115.555) 
Constant 24,157.682*** 8,561.684 27,836.793*** 4,929.219 22,696.749*** 17,263.787*** 26,225.748*** 18,407.469*** 
  (1,776.993) (15,684.661) (3,716.418) (16,341.959) (546.682) (4,028.837) (1,047.587) (3,957.451) 
          
Observations 81 81 81 81 753 753 753 753 
R-squared 0.016 0.273 0.033 0.269 0.003 0.078 0.025 0.084 
         Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the public good game for free riders (1-4) and 
cooperative individuals (5-8). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cut off point: 50,000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In order to truly be able to separate the different situations in the public good and dictator 
games, we have chosen to regress the decision time separately for the free riders and the 
cooperative in the public good game, which is presented in table 15, and for fair and selfish 
individuals in the dictator game, presented in table 16. 
 
Table 16 
Regression of decision time in dictator game for fair and selfish individuals separately 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CR 
Fair 
CR 
Fair 
IQ 
Fair 
IQ 
Fair 
CR 
Selfish 
CR 
Selfish 
IQ 
Selfish 
IQ 
Selfish 
         crscore -288.873 -210.072   -1,001.297 -644.679   
 
(605.763) (611.193)   (892.171) (937.966)   
big5a  81.187  81.166  204.230  195.120 
 
 (113.596)  (113.342)  (178.995)  (176.186) 
big5c  30.285  33.858  -55.811  12.774 
 
 (110.853)  (110.248)  (183.803)  (174.493) 
big5e  -129.805  -118.444  -25.464  85.374 
 
 (99.575)  (98.314)  (176.584)  (170.817) 
big5n  -91.147  -86.111  -3.601  116.527 
 
 (101.151)  (101.357)  (172.250)  (167.336) 
big5o  -94.548  -88.553  -124.606  -200.344 
 
 (99.763)  (99.111)  (164.362)  (167.379) 
young  -2,720.580  -2,217.156  -3,718.392  -1,621.127 
 
 (2,108.677)  (2,108.602)  (2,753.580)  (2,767.427) 
youngmiddle  -4,503.554***  -4,131.134***  -351.030  1,236.353 
 
 (1,460.827)  (1,469.375)  (2,540.475)  (2,409.472) 
old  7,294.695***  7,023.071***  2,343.415  -88.956 
 
 (1,617.142)  (1,648.778)  (3,643.834)  (3,393.901) 
sex  925.590  946.907  1,422.191  1,139.757 
 
 (1,347.795)  (1,294.796)  (2,141.290)  (2,091.383) 
highschool  -2,818.343  -2,724.295  -2,259.393  -2,862.602 
 
 (2,299.121)  (2,295.868)  (3,978.982)  (4,073.115) 
shortuni  -4,788.339**  -4,687.346**  -4,013.288  -3,654.597 
 
 (2,181.971)  (2,186.729)  (3,899.270)  (4,015.872) 
longuni  -3,091.066  -3,052.901  -5,396.131  -4,949.505 
 
 (2,619.571)  (2,622.938)  (4,114.886)  (4,146.126) 
iqscore   -724.180*** -249.276   -1,374.811*** -1,371.132*** 
 
  (195.923) (190.088)   (318.314) (344.136) 
Constant 30,211.640*** 37,539.611*** 35,997.119*** 38,476.860*** 35,419.716*** 38,325.140*** 47,462.369*** 44,501.148*** 
 
(1,042.558) (7,200.247) (1,824.260) (7,210.509) (1,762.129) (11,902.330) (3,420.151) (11,439.789) 
         Observations 606 606 606 606 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.000 0.100 0.023 0.103 0.005 0.037 0.060 0.083 
         Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the dictator game for fair individuals (1-4) 
and selfish (5-8). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cut off point: 75,000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For the public good game, we find that IQ significantly lowers the decision time for 
cooperative individuals, that is, these individuals act and decide faster than low IQ 
cooperative individuals. The only control variable that seems to have a significant effect on 
this result is the age variable, old cooperative individuals have spent much more time on this 
task. We could not find any relations for the CR score, neither could we for the free rider 
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situation. 
In the dictator game we, once again, only find relations for IQ. We find that a higher IQ is 
related to a shorter decision time for selfish individuals. We also find that a higher IQ shortens 
the decision time for fair participants, when regressing without control variables. 
 
5.3 Marginal effects 
It is not obvious how to interpret the different effects of the CR and IQ scores, because the 
scales vary considerably. The CR scale only goes between 0 and 3, while the IQ scale goes 
from 0 to 20. One step on the CR scale therefore represents several steps on the IQ scale. For 
that reason, we will also present the marginal effects, that is, the effect of an increase with one 
standard deviation, of CR and IQ respectively, in order to actually be able to compare the two 
effects. These have been calculated by multiplying the actual coefficients received for CR and 
IQ with each of their standard deviations. For the probit models, we multiplied the marginal 
effects (one unit change effect on the dependent variable) with the standard deviations, in 
order to get a comparable measure and proper interpretation. 
The tables below present marginal effects of an increase of one standard deviation for CR 
and IQ respectively. The effects are calculated from the results including control variables. 
Table 17 presents the marginal effects of CR and IQ on each of the above analysed games. 
Table 18 shows the marginal effect of CR and IQ on the decision times for each task. These 
effects are discussed in detail in section 6.2. 
 
Table 17 
Marginal effects in standard deviations 
 Risk aversion Loss aversion 
 iLEE1 iLEE2 iLEE1 iLEE2 
CR -0.314 0.135 -0.084 0.106 
IQ -0.123 0.167 -0.063 0.010 
 Public good Dictator 
 Free rider Cooperative Fair Selfish 
CR 0.009 0.007 -0.044 0.067 
IQ 0.001 0.002 -0.019 0.064 
Notes: Effects of one standard deviation increase in CR and IQ scores respectively, for all games presented in 
the sections above. 
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Table 18 
Marginal effects in standard deviations for time variables 
 Risk aversion Loss aversion 
 iLEE1 iLEE2 iLEE1 iLEE2 
CR 2157.589 692.481 3199.051 1751.055 
IQ -1194.795 -1635.536 -302.811 -882.310 
 Public good Dictator 
CR 
-198.670 -241.179 
Free rider Cooperative Fair Selfish 
-1136.125 -276.177 -232.130 -712.370 
IQ 
-815.108 -1362.052 
Free rider Cooperative Fair Selfish 
-762.443 -864.338 -782.727 -4305.354 
Notes: Effects of one standard deviation increase in CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on each of 
the games presented in the sections above. 
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
In order to validate our regressions, we have performed several robustness checks. First of 
all, we have chosen to use the variables age and education as dummy variables in our 
regressions, separating them into different groups. This allows for non-linear relations when 
running an OLS. We present all regressions with the ordinary variables for age and education 
in appendix 1. When comparing these with the results obtained in our analysis, we could not 
find any notable differences. This justifies our decision to use the dummy variables in our 
analysis. 
Furthermore, as mentioned before, we have chosen to drop some data from the time 
variables, since we had some serious outliers. In order to make sure that our cut point in the 
data is valid, we have performed a sensitivity analysis for each task. The results from this 
analysis can be found in appendix 2. We present regressions with the original cut point and 
two additional points, one below and one above the chosen cut point, in order to check that 
the chosen point does not change the results dramatically. These points were chosen after a 
visual analysis of the distribution of the data. When examining these regressions, we expect 
there to be some differences, because there is approximately 3 minutes difference between the 
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cut points that are included. However, for most of the regressions, the results of the main 
regressors do not change dramatically, and most importantly, they do not change signs. The 
regression that might be discussable is the loss aversion decision time (table 29) where the 
signs do change for IQ score. However, the signs change in the right direction, since the effect 
of the IQ score gets smaller when the cut point increases, and between the actual cut point and 
the last cut point, the effect gets even more negative. Otherwise, our cut points seem legit 
according to this analysis.  
When analysing the public good and dictator games, we have chosen to use a probit 
model, because we found this to be an interesting angle to use for examination. However, we 
have also performed regular OLS regressions, including the same regressors, just to be sure 
our findings would go in the same direction. These regression outputs can be found in 
appendix 3. Basically, these regressions suggest that CR significantly increases the amount of 
money given to the common pot in the public good game, suggesting that CR also would have 
a positive effect on the cooperative situations. We can confirm that our results do go in the 
same direction. In the dictator game regression, we find from the OLS, that both CR and IQ 
would increase the amount of money the dictator would keep to him-/herself, however, the 
effect of CR would be somewhat stronger. This would then imply a possibility of these 
variables to have a positive effect on the selfish situation. We can confirm this, as well as both 
of them having a negative effect on the fair situation. 
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6 Discussion 
 
This paper examines the differences between cognitive reflection and IQ, primarily 
focusing on the time spent on performing different tasks, such as decision making under risk 
and money distribution. We have also mapped out the effects of CR and IQ, separately, in 
individual’s behaviour, when performing these tasks. Furthermore, we sought to summarize 
research concerning cognitive ability, and different types of cognitive ability measures, in one 
paper, in order to properly be able to discuss the differences between CR and IQ. 
Our hypothesis is that there is a difference between CR and IQ as measures of cognitive 
ability. Our main hypothesis was that people scoring high on the CRT would be slower when 
making decisions of importance or difficulty, assuming that they would be more considerate 
and thorough when making them. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that CR is 
related to, and supposed to measure, the activeness of system 2 (see section 3.1). A high CRT 
score then indicates a more active system 2, which means slower, but more considerate, 
actions. 
 
6.1 Main findings 
We can confirm this hypothesis with the results we obtained. We found that a higher CRT 
score would in fact increase the time spent in several tasks. In the risk aversion gamble, when 
individuals choose between two lotteries, one riskier than the other (no losses possible), we 
found that an increase in one CRT score, on average, would increase the decision time with 
approximately 20 seconds. This result was found to be highly significant. Additionally, we 
found this relation to be even stronger when examining the same task, however, with a 
possible loss involved when choosing the risky lottery. The average time spent on this task 
would then increase with approximately 35 seconds, with an increase of one CRT score. This 
result was also highly significant. These results are from the tasks in iLEE1, however, they 
are confirmed by the iLEE2 in the loss aversion gamble, but not in the risk aversion gamble. 
Further on, when examining the public good and dictator games, CR does not seem to 
have an impact on the time spent on these tasks, however, we found that IQ does. We will 
come back to this result later in this section. Based on the analysis of Moritz et al. (2014) this 
is somewhat a conflicting result, as they found that CRT scores had an effect on decision 
speed, where a high CRT score would imply a moderate response time, in between the very 
long and short ones of low scoring individuals, whereas our findings implies that a high CR 
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results in either a longer response time in some tasks or has no effect at all on the decision 
time in others. However, assuming that the results (CRT increasing the response time) from 
the risk and loss aversion gambles are caused by the fact that these individuals actually made 
better use of their system 2, it does provide further support for Rubinstein’s (2007) idea that 
decisions made on the basis of cognitive reasoning need more time than those of an intuitive 
nature. Still we do not find this relationship for the public good and dictator games. One 
possible explanation to why we cannot find any impact of CR on these decisions could be a 
greater influence of emotion rather than cognitive reasoning, as these choices include 
decisions that also affect others, not only on an individual level as in the prior gambles, a 
topic also discussed by Nielsen et al. (2014), who argue that these games are imposing an 
emotional dilemma for the participants.   
When we compare the effect of a high CRT score on response time to the effect of a high 
IQ score, we anticipated that there would be a difference. Still, we did not know whether the 
IQ score would increase or decrease the time spent on these tasks, however, we hypothesized 
that it, at least, would not increase the response time in the same extent as a high CRT score 
would do. Again, the results obtained confirm our theory. Not only does IQ have a different 
effect on response time in the risk aversion gamble, it actually decreases the response time 
with approximately 4 seconds (in iLEE1, 5 seconds in iLEE2), when the IQ score increases 
with one unit. This result is in line with prior research suggesting a negative correlation 
between intelligence and response time (Bates and Stough, 1997). However, remember that 
one additional IQ score is not comparable to one additional CRT score, and thus, the 
differences in effect seem larger than they actually are. For this reason, we will discuss the 
marginal effects of one standard deviation change in section 6.2, in order to obtain 
comparable measures of the effects. In the loss aversion gamble, we did not find any 
particular impact of IQ when control variables where included.  
Further on, in the domain of the public good and dictator games, we found the following; 
in the public good game, an additional IQ score will decrease the time spent on the task, with 
approximately 2.6 seconds on average. In the dictator game, the time decreased with 
approximately 4.2 seconds, again, a result in line with prior studies (Bates and Stough, 1997). 
We did not find any particular influence of CR on response time for these tasks; a higher IQ 
on the other hand, will in fact shorten the response time when making decisions on the subject 
of monetary distribution. Additionally, we found, from the probit regressions on the dictator 
game, that IQ had an impact on the probability of certain situations (discussed later in this 
section), which might at least partly explain the shorter time.  
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Furthermore, we hypothesized there to be a difference in the effect of CR and IQ on the 
actual results of the games, as we believe that they might be capturing different dimensions of 
cognitive ability. First of all, we found that when playing the decision making gambles (both 
risk and loss aversion), CR and IQ both had an equally directed effect on the shift point (when 
significant). That is, for the risk aversion gamble, a higher CR and/or IQ decreases the shift 
point, which implies lesser risk aversion. This result is in line with, and supports, a large 
literature of previous findings regarding cognitive ability and risk aversion (Frederick, 2005; 
Burks et al. 2009; Dohmen et al. 2010; Benjamin et al. 2013; Cueva et al. 2015). However, in 
our results, CR does have a somewhat stronger effect than IQ (see section 6.2 for marginal 
effect comparisons). As for the loss aversion gamble, the same effect was found. A higher 
score of either CR or IQ decreases the shift point, implying lesser loss aversion in this case. 
The results for iLEE2 show the opposite effects, however, this was anticipated due to the bias 
induced by noise, a result found by Andersson et al. (2013). The tests in iLEE1 and iLEE2 are 
constructed differently, so that the risk neutral shift points are located early in iLEE1 and 
fairly late in iLEE2, and thus, one can be biased by wanting to choose a shift point somewhere 
in the middle of the gamble. This is discussed in detail section 4.2.4 and further in section 
6.2.1.  
If we analyse all of these differences further, we can connect back to the dual-process 
theory regarding system 1 and 2. The fact that CR has a stronger effect on the shift point in 
the decision making gamble, could possibly be explained by the fact that a higher CRT score 
might be an indicator of the system 2 being more active for those individuals. An active 
system 2 implies that they would be more considerate in the making of these decisions, which 
requires some extra deliberation in order to be well executed. The fact that a higher CRT 
score means that these individuals on average would shift earlier in the game, further suggests 
that they would be less risk averse. To be risk neutral, the participants would shift at point 3 in 
the risk aversion gamble for iLEE1. Here we found that the average shift point for individuals 
with a high CRT score (2 or 3) is 4.9. That is, according to a t-test we conducted, individuals 
who scored high on the CRT, shifted significantly earlier than the low scoring (0 or 1) 
individuals, who shifted, on average, at point 5.5. However, we did not find this relation for 
participants with high (11-20) or low (0-10) IQ scores respectively. This result could possibly 
be an indication of the fact that people with high CR in general are more rational, as it is 
rational to maximize utility (in this case in form of expected outcome), a relationship not 
found when examining IQ. This is in line with prior findings of CR being strongly correlated 
to rational thinking, whereas IQ is not (Toplak et al. 2011; Stanovich et al. 2011). Further on, 
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this result relates to those of Campitelli and Gerrans (2014), who did discuss what the CRT 
actually measures, and found that it might be measuring a combination of both mathematical 
skills and rationality. In addition, the result itself, could further validate the evidence that CR 
and IQ are not perfectly correlated, and thus, do in fact measure different dimensions of 
cognitive ability. When examining the loss aversion gamble, we found that the individuals 
with high CRT scores did shift significantly earlier, as did the individuals with high IQ scores. 
That is, higher cognitive ability might be related to less loss aversion.  
Moving on to the results of the money distribution games; for the public good game we 
could not find a particular relationship neither between IQ and the probability of being a free 
rider nor of being cooperative. A higher CR, on the other hand, would increase the probability 
of being a free rider, but has no effect on the probability of being cooperative. This result 
supports those of Nielsen et al. (2014), who also found a positive relation between CR and the 
probability of being a free rider, but found no relation to IQ. However, we did find that an 
increased IQ is related to a short decision time for cooperative individuals. The reason for this 
result may very well be that high IQ individuals realize at a sooner stage, the advantages of 
being cooperative in the public good game, and therefore do not need as much time to decide, 
as individuals with low IQ.  
In the dictator game, we found that both CR and IQ increase the probability of being 
selfish. We also found that CR decreases the probability of being fair. This result could be 
linked to those of Cappelen et al. (2014), who find a strong connection between selfishness 
and deliberation, which under the assumptions of dual-process theory, possibly could be 
connected to higher CR. Furthermore, we found that selfish individuals with high IQ were 
faster in making their money distribution decision than those with lower IQ. Our findings 
contradict with some prior ones, who have found that cognitive ability, in general, does not 
predict individual’s choices in dictator games (Brandstätter and Güth, 2002; Benjamin et al. 
2013). All in all, regarding the outcomes of the money distribution games, CR seems to be a 
better indicator of behaviour than does IQ, since we found significant effects from CR for all 
the various situations that we have analysed, in both games.   
 
6.2 General discussion   
In the previous section we discuss the main findings of this study. However, when we 
compare the effects of CR and IQ, this can be slightly confusing, considering that the scales 
differ for the CR and IQ scores. In order to make a reasonable comparison of the size of these 
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effects, we have calculated the marginal effects for one standard deviation change in each 
score. 
Starting with time analysis and the risk aversion gamble, we find that a higher CRT score 
increases the time spent on this task, while a higher IQ score instead decreases the response 
time. If the CRT score increases with one standard deviation, the time will increase with 
approximately 21.6 seconds, meanwhile, an increase in one standard deviation for the IQ 
score will decrease the time with approximately 11.9 seconds. So, not only is the effect from 
CR twice as strong, but we also see that the measures affect the time spent in opposite 
directions, as discussed earlier. Additionally, both of these effects were found to be 
significant. These results hold for iLEE1, and we also found significant results for iLEE2, 
regarding IQ, however, with a slightly stronger effect than in iLEE1. When examining loss 
aversion, we only find significant results for CR. We find that an increase in CRT score with 
one standard deviation increases the decision time with approximately 32 seconds (17.5 for 
iLEE2). For IQ, the time would slightly decrease, however, not significantly. This implies that 
when facing losses, in comparison to the risk aversion gamble (where losses are not possible, 
only smaller and bigger gains) an individual with high CR would be more careful when 
making the decision, and thus, spend some additional time on it. For the public good and 
dictator games, we only find significant results for IQ. One standard deviation increase will 
decrease the time with 8.2 seconds in the public good game and with 13.67 seconds in the 
dictator game. Nevertheless, we find that CR also would decrease the time, however, not 
significantly.  
Regarding the actual results of the games, we observe that both CR and IQ will decrease 
the shift point in the risk aversion gamble, that is, a higher score of either or both, relates to 
less risk aversion. The effect is somewhat stronger for CR than IQ, as one standard deviation 
increase in CR generates a decrease in shift point with 0.31 and 0.12 for IQ (iLEE1). In the 
loss aversion gamble, the effects are the same, direction wise, but very small for both CR and 
IQ. For the iLEE2, as mentioned earlier, we obtain opposite results. An increased CR and/or 
IQ with one standard deviation will increase the shift point in the risk aversion gamble with 
0.14 and 0.17 respectively. This positive effect was found for the loss aversion gamble as 
well, however, only for CR. However, when comparing individuals with low and high CRT 
scores (0-1 versus 2-3), there exists a significant difference in shift point in the risk aversion 
gamble, where the high CR group choose the risky gamble significantly earlier than the low 
CR group, indicating that individuals with high CR are less risk averse, and therefore in this 
case more effective, as their average shift point is closer to the risk neutral shift point. So, 
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even though the effect of CR and IQ may be equal, individuals scoring high on the CRT still 
seem to act more rational and thus be less risk averse, again, a result in line with prior 
research that confirms a stronger relation between CR and rationality than for IQ (Toplak et 
al. 2011; Stanovich et al. 2011). This finding can also be related to Moritz et al. (2014), who 
discuss the phenomenon of under- and overthinking. They found that a moderate thinking 
time lead to the best choices, and thus, if we assume that the CR high scoring individuals, 
who spent longer time on average on this gamble, have a moderate time, our results agree. It 
can then be discussed that individuals scoring low might be under-thinking the matter which 
results in making worse choices, due to their intuition. This also is in line with the theory 
about system 1 and 2, which implies that under-thinking might result in non-optimal choices. 
However, Moritz et al. (2014) also discuss the matter of over-thinking, and argue that this 
phenomenon might as well generate bad choices. They believe that optimal choices are made 
when the decision time is moderate. We have not examined over-thinking in this study, but it 
would certainly be an interesting angle for future research. If we inspect the average shift 
points for the loss aversion gamble we find that participants, on average, shift after it is 
optimal to do so. That is, the participants were on average loss averse. This might be due to 
the fact that the risk neutral point is the second choice, which could induce a downward bias. 
This is in line with Andersson et al. (2013), who study whether the effect of cognitive ability 
on risk preferences is biased by noise, depending on the gamble presented. Furthermore, we 
find that individuals with high CR and/or IQ scores have even earlier shift points than low 
scorers, which again indicates that higher cognitive ability is related to a more efficient 
behaviour. 
When it comes to the public good game, we cannot really compare the effects between CR 
and IQ, as we did not find any significant results for IQ. However, we did find this for the 
dictator game, and especially for the selfish situation. In this case the effects seem to be 
similar, and increase the probability of being selfish with approximately 6-7 percentages, 
when either CR or IQ increases with one standard deviation respectively. In addition, we find 
that an increase in CR decreases the probability of being fair with 4.4 percentages. So here, 
CR and IQ have an equal effect on the selfish situation, at the same time as a higher CR also 
is related to a decreased fairness. 
One especially interesting thing is that, when participants play the decision making 
gambles, not all of them would be rational in their choices. That means that once they have 
made the choice to take the risky lottery, some of them actually changed back, and choose the 
safe lottery later in the same gamble. This is not reasonable by any means, as the further in the 
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gamble you get, the larger the expected outcome of the risky lottery becomes in relation to the 
safe lottery. So once an individual chooses the risky lottery, he/she should never change back 
again. This finding is probably due to some of the participants not quite understanding the 
task properly, or even maybe just being ignorant. However, we did analyse this phenomenon 
further, and found that the irrational individuals had scored significantly lower than the 
rational ones, both on the CRT and the IQ test. Regarding the CRT, this result is not 
surprising, as it has been found strongly related to this trait (Toplak et al. 2011), but rather for 
IQ which is considered bad at predicting rational behaviour (Stanovich et al. 2011). So 
basically, irrational participants were less cognitively able, in general, than the rational ones, a 
result which might, to some extent, rule out the fact that they were merely ignorant. However, 
if they were ignorant performing this task, they might as well have been ignorant or sloppy 
when performing the cognitive ability tests, and thus, have been scoring badly for that reason.  
We also examined consistent behaviour in the risk aversion gamble, that is, whether 
participants have had the same risk preferences in iLEE1 and iLEE2. We found a significant 
difference in cognitive ability between consistent and inconsistent individuals, where 
consistent individuals have higher CR and IQ. In addition, we found that individuals who 
exhibit optimal behaviour, that is, rational, consistent and utility (expected outcome) 
maximizing choices had significantly higher CR and IQ than those with risk seeking or risk 
averse preferences. That is, higher cognitive ability is in fact related to efficient choices, 
regardless of whether it is measured with the CRT or an IQ test. 
Another matter worth discussing is gender differences. This is a topic reviewed in most 
research concerning CR, and although it is not our primary focus, we do not want to neglect 
it. First of all, we did not find any difference between men and women in IQ scores, just as 
hypothesized, based on past literature (Halpern et al. 2011). However, again anticipated in the 
light of prior research on CR (Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al. 2009; Obrecht et al. 2009 etc.), 
we did find that men, on average, have significantly higher CRT scores. When examining the 
results from the time analysis, on the other hand, we could not find a significant gender effect 
in any of the regressions. After all, we can observe that females are somewhat less loss averse, 
and therefore, will generally choose the risky lottery in the loss aversion gamble, 
approximately 0.1-0.2 shift points earlier than men (iLEE2). This, in turn, implies that women 
act less efficient than men in this situation. This can be related to the fact that women scored 
significantly lower on the CRT than men, and as found by Toplak et al. (2011), higher CR is 
related to rationality. This is also confirmed by Stanovich et al. (2011) who claim that 
rationality is driven by type 2 processing. Otherwise, we could not capture any gender effects 
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in any of our regressions where we found significant effects of CR and IQ scores. This might 
indicate that there actually is no remarkable difference in the effect of cognitive ability 
between men and women when making these different decisions. 
Moving on to another variable of interest, we found differences between the age groups. 
Participants in the ages 61-80 scored lower on both the CRT and the IQ test. We also found 
that the younger participants, aged 18-29, scored significantly higher than the other groups on 
both tests. Further on, we do capture these effects in our time analysis, where in most 
regressions, the younger groups of participants (18-45) are significantly faster, on average. 
We also observe this for the group of older participants (61-80), who on average are slower 
when performing these tasks. When relating to the fact that the younger scored higher, and the 
older scored lower, on both tests of cognitive ability, this fact explains itself. Again this result 
was anticipated, as it has been shown that cognitive ability typically declines with age 
(Hertzog, 2011). 
 
6.2.1 Validity and Reliability 
As mentioned earlier, Andersson et al. (2013) find supporting evidence for the fact that 
the relation between cognitive ability and decision making would be biased with noise, and 
thus making the relationship spurious. It is an interesting topic, and very important to keep in 
mind, when interpreting the results from this, and all other studies using similar tests and not 
controlling for this issue, as it highly criticizes the validity and reliability of the decision 
making tests. And thus, it would also imply that the results found might not actually be true, 
or at least, cannot be trusted completely until tested with a valid test. However, we found it 
important to include these results in our study, because it is a very big part of research in this 
field, and one of our purposes is to summarize and clarify different effects of cognitive ability 
measures. 
To some extent, we have eliminated this bias when examining the behaviour of what we 
call optimal individuals (rational, consistent and utility maximizing). Because individuals who 
have been rational and consistent have probably understood the task at hand, and thus, might 
not have been affected by the bias to the same extent as those who have not exhibited this 
behaviour. And thus, when examining these individuals and their preferences, we found that 
risk neutral choice individuals did score higher on both cognitive ability tests, and hence, 
these results might not be as spurious as the other results obtained from the decision making 
tasks. 
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6.2.2 Future research 
Since we are among the first to examine the difference in time spent on various tasks, 
concerning decisions in different situation, between CR and IQ (at least, as far as we know), it 
might be of interest to examine this relation further. A more detailed examination, of each 
situation separately, would be interesting, as well as extending the comparison to other 
measures of cognitive ability and control variables. In particular, it would be appealing to 
explore new versions of the CRT, which contain more questions, and thus, might give the test 
a stronger reliability, since three questions might be considered too few to estimate an 
individual’s actual CR level. Also, it might be uncertain to compare high and low CR, based 
on only three questions. 
Of course, since the decision making (risk and loss aversion) have been criticized and 
shown to be biased, it is important to study solutions to this matter, whether it is to control for 
this bias in different ways, or if it is to construct the tests in a different way so that the bias 
can be eliminated. Either way, a solution would benefit this field, and future research within 
the fields of decision making, as this kind of test is a simple way to test for preferences, which 
is always appreciated by researchers. It does not only simplify the research, but it often 
generates valid results, since the participants do not tire of participating when the tests are not 
too long and tedious, especially if it is a sample of great variation of participants.  
 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
We have come across some interesting distinctions between the CR and IQ measures in 
this study. We found that CR is related to slower but more efficient decisions, an effect 
showed to be the opposite for IQ. This result indicates an activeness of system 2 for high CR 
individuals, which is important in the sense that we might be able to provide further support 
for the existence of dual-system processes, as many have questioned their reliability. 
Furthermore, this result justifies the CRT as a test of its own, and the fact that it is not “just” 
another IQ test. We also found that both CR and IQ have similar directional effects on some 
of the tasks (actual choices not decision time). Additionally, we found that both measures of 
CR and IQ are positively related to rational behaviour. This is a noteworthy result, as 
economic models generally assume that individuals are rational. Our findings disprove this 
idea, and rather suggest that this trait depends on an individual’s level of cognitive ability, and 
these measures should therefore be accounted for by economists. We also observe that CR 
might be a better predictor of behaviour in some situations. Furthermore, the CRT could 
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possibly be used to measure intuition in people, which could be useful. Considering that in 
some situations, being intuitive is very important, but in others, it can be rather risky, because 
of the sloppiness that can arise. Consequently, our results imply that a difference between 
these measures exists, and that they do capture different aspects of cognitive ability.  
Hopefully, we have been able to summarize and map the effects of cognitive ability in 
different forms, in several situations concerning decision making, capturing different 
aversions and other aspects. As this paper aims to collect and assemble a broad span of tasks 
and characteristics regarding these measures, up till today based on one of the most vast and 
varied samples used in this field, we believe that this part of the paper alone, may be a 
contribution to the existing literature. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
This section holds all regressions made in section 5.2, but with the variables age and 
education instead of their dummy equivalents. 
 
Table 19 
Regressions of risk aversion gamble decision switch point 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CR 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE2 
CR 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
         crscore -0.319*** -0.286*** 
  
0.128** 0.112* 
  
 
(0.046) (0.048) 
  
(0.057) (0.059) 
  
big5a 
 
0.038*** 
 
0.038*** 
 
0.012 
 
0.012 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
big5c 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
0.001 
 
-0.000 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
big5e 
 
0.013 
 
0.017* 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.014 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
big5n 
 
0.023*** 
 
0.027*** 
 
0.007 
 
0.005 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
big5o 
 
0.012 
 
0.009 
 
0.016 
 
0.018 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
age 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.017*** 
 
-0.013*** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
sex 
 
0.059 
 
0.168 
 
-0.145 
 
-0.173 
  
(0.115) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.140) 
edu 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.048* 
 
0.049 
 
0.050 
  
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
iqscore 
  
-0.036** -0.042** 
  
0.070*** 0.053** 
   
(0.017) (0.018) 
  
(0.022) (0.023) 
Constant 5.699*** 3.690*** 5.502*** 3.574*** 6.420*** 6.244*** 5.971*** 5.945*** 
 
(0.093) (0.616) (0.171) (0.645) (0.124) (0.767) (0.230) (0.823) 
         Observations 1,399 1,399 1,399 1,399 856 856 856 856 
R-squared 0.031 0.056 0.003 0.035 0.006 0.027 0.013 0.030 
Notes: OLS regression with CR and IQ score respectively on decision making in covering risk aversion with data 
from both iLEE1 (1-4) and iLEE2 (5-8). Equivalent to table 8 in section 5. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20 
Regression of loss aversion gamble decision switch point 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CR 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
IQ 
iLEE1 
CR 
iLEE2 
CR 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
IQ 
iLEE2 
         crscore -0.091*** -0.081*** 
  
0.105*** 0.097*** 
  
 
(0.029) (0.030) 
  
(0.024) (0.025) 
  
big5a 
 
0.012* 
 
0.012* 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
big5c 
 
0.007 
 
0.008 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
big5e 
 
0.008 
 
0.009 
 
0.002 
 
-0.000 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
big5n 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.018*** 
 
0.007* 
 
0.007 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
big5o 
 
0.013** 
 
0.012** 
 
0.003 
 
0.005 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
age 
 
-0.004* 
 
-0.006** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
-0.005*** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
sex 
 
-0.001 
 
0.029 
 
-0.124** 
 
-0.165*** 
  
(0.072) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) 
edu 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.013 
 
0.002 
 
0.008 
  
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
iqscore 
  
-0.010 -0.023** 
  
0.012 0.001 
   
(0.010) (0.011) 
  
(0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 3.443*** 2.140*** 3.391*** 2.234*** 7.480*** 7.529*** 7.541*** 7.697*** 
 
(0.057) (0.410) (0.099) (0.422) (0.052) (0.306) (0.077) (0.319) 
         Observations 1,791 1,791 1,791 1,791 1,132 1,132 1,132 1,132 
R-squared 0.005 0.022 0.001 0.020 0.018 0.035 0.002 0.020 
Notes: OLS regression with CR and IQ score respectively on decision making in covering loss aversion with 
data from both iLEE1 (1-4) and iLEE2 (5-8). Equivalent to table 9 in section 5. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21 
Regressions of public good game money distribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Free 
rider CR 
Free 
rider CR 
Free 
rider 
IQ 
Free 
rider 
IQ 
Cooperative 
CR 
Cooperative 
CR 
Cooperative 
IQ 
Cooperative 
IQ 
         crscore 0.111*** 0.081* 
  
0.059** 0.0198 
  
 
(0.040) (0.044) 
  
(0.024) (0.0255) 
  
big5a 
 
-0.039*** 
 
-0.039*** 
 
0.0121** 
 
0.012** 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.00514) 
 
(0.005) 
big5c 
 
0.014 
 
0.014 
 
-0.0102* 
 
-0.010* 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.00554) 
 
(0.006) 
big5e 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.010 
 
0.00494 
 
0.005 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.00502) 
 
(0.005) 
big5n 
 
0.004 
 
0.003 
 
-0.0121** 
 
-0.012** 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.00480) 
 
(0.005) 
big5o 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.010 
 
0.00609 
 
0.006 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.00472) 
 
(0.005) 
age 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
0.00206 
 
0.002 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.00198) 
 
(0.002) 
sex 
 
-0.183* 
 
-0.215** 
 
-0.241*** 
 
-0.249*** 
  
(0.097) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.0597) 
 
(0.059) 
edu 
 
0.033 
 
0.041* 
 
0.0426*** 
 
0.044*** 
  
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.0130) 
 
(0.013) 
hypo 
 
0.223 
 
0.215 
 
-0.529*** 
 
-0.530*** 
  
(0.193) 
 
(0.192) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.136) 
take 
 
0.386*** 
 
0.385*** 
 
0.359*** 
 
0.359*** 
  
(0.091) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.0590) 
 
(0.059) 
iqscore 
  
0.008 -0.001 
  
0.001 0.002 
   
(0.013) (0.014) 
  
(0.008) (0.009) 
Constant -1.750*** -0.701 -1.648*** -0.544 -0.336*** -0.766** -0.260*** -0.751** 
 
(0.078) (0.557) (0.123) (0.574) (0.045) (0.349) (0.078) (0.361) 
         Observations 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 
Notes: Probit regression with CR and IQ score respectively on the share of money (DKK) given to (or taken 
from) the common pot in the public good game. Regression 1-4 is the probability of the participant being a free 
rider. Regression 5-8 is the probability of the participant of being cooperative. Equivalent to table 10 in section 
5. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 22 
Regressions of dictator game money distribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Fair 
CR 
Fair 
CR 
Fair 
IQ 
Fair 
IQ 
Selfish 
CR 
Selfish 
CR 
Selfish 
IQ 
Selfish 
IQ 
         crscore -0.099*** -0.100*** 
  
0.219*** 0.203*** 
  
 
(0.031) (0.033) 
  
(0.035) (0.037) 
  
big5a 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
big5c 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.005 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
big5e 
 
-0.016** 
 
-0.014** 
 
0.009 
 
0.004 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
big5n 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.010 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
big5o 
 
0.020*** 
 
0.019*** 
 
-0.015** 
 
-0.012* 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
sex 
 
0.006 
 
0.050 
 
-0.066 
 
-0.145* 
  
(0.078) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.085) 
edu 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.012 
 
0.058*** 
 
0.064*** 
  
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
age 
 
0.014*** 
 
0.013*** 
 
-0.016*** 
 
-0.011*** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
iqscore 
  
-0.040*** -0.012 
  
0.088*** 0.065*** 
   
(0.011) (0.012) 
  
(0.012) (0.013) 
Constant 0.181*** -0.906* 0.381*** -0.949** -1.029*** 0.504 -1.483*** 0.209 
 
(0.059) (0.464) (0.101) (0.477) (0.069) (0.496) (0.117) (0.518) 
         Observations 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 
Notes: Probit regression with CR and IQ score respectively on the share of money (DKK) taken to keep in the 
dictator game. Regression 1-4 is the probability of the participant to choose to be fair. Regression 5-8 is the 
probability of the participant being selfish. Equivalent to table 11 in section 5. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23 
Regressions of decision time for risk aversion gamble 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES CR iLEE1 CR iLEE1 IQ iLEE1 IQ iLEE1 CR iLEE2 CR iLEE2 IQ iLEE2 IQ iLEE2 
         crscore 1,902.993*** 1,864.919*** 541.730 572.739 
 
(511.641) (506.472)   (621.805) (604.765)   
big5a  291.933***  300.609***  216.515*  208.978* 
 
 (98.184)  (99.209)  (116.573)  (115.323) 
big5c  132.087  146.881  -15.337  -2.853 
 
 (110.130)  (110.907)  (132.730)  (131.723) 
big5e  -199.866**  -232.368**  -88.758  -68.837 
 
 (100.596)  (100.584)  (128.152)  (127.838) 
big5n  -66.978  -99.559  140.757  155.014 
 
 (99.303)  (98.944)  (101.585)  (101.089) 
big5o  269.209***  301.633***  7.347  12.584 
 
 (93.610)  (94.272)  (110.012)  (110.510) 
age  345.408***  305.069***  501.251***  466.265*** 
 
 (41.296)  (44.648)  (46.719)  (48.184) 
sex  703.168  -220.304  239.573  -281.074 
 
 (1,229.693)  (1,202.583)  (1,407.736)  (1,374.920) 
edu  -243.303  -99.421  113.862  170.516 
 
 (281.499)  (282.957)  (323.744)  (319.345) 
iqscore   -838.762*** -409.245**   -1,236.110*** -562.715** 
 
  (189.855) (191.762)   (224.333) (222.908) 
Constant 55,960.947*** 29,188.212*** 66,809.166*** 37,116.920*** 53,689.597*** 24,873.381*** 66,478.516*** 31,385.571*** 
 
(974.805) (6,721.096) (1,902.287) (7,168.457) (1,235.243) (8,164.540) (2,313.571) (8,320.712) 
         Observations 1,072 1,072 1,072 1,072 738 738 738 738 
R-squared 0.013 0.111 0.019 0.103 0.001 0.161 0.041 0.167 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the decision making gamble 
covering risk aversion (no losses possible). Data from iLEE1 (1-4) and iLEE2 (5-8). Equivalent to table 12 in 
section 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 24 
Regressions of decision time for loss aversion gamble 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES CR iLEE1 CR iLEE1 IQ iLEE1 IQ iLEE1 CR iLEE2 CR iLEE2 IQ iLEE2 IQ iLEE2 
         crscore 3,083.595*** 2,849.569*** 
  
1,642.158*** 1,558.828*** 
  
 
(506.836) (516.271) 
  
(575.070) (574.202) 
  
big5a 
 
192.641* 
 
185.141* 
 
-103.859 
 
-122.809 
  
(100.478) 
 
(101.919) 
 
(119.219) 
 
(119.497) 
big5c 
 
216.507* 
 
209.548* 
 
136.788 
 
149.108 
  
(112.353) 
 
(112.720) 
 
(114.737) 
 
(114.781) 
big5e 
 
-189.268* 
 
-225.251** 
 
-60.706 
 
-73.203 
  
(103.500) 
 
(103.872) 
 
(107.505) 
 
(107.133) 
big5n 
 
7.244 
 
-33.987 
 
-189.520* 
 
-203.410* 
  
(99.283) 
 
(100.161) 
 
(104.654) 
 
(105.312) 
big5o 
 
254.938*** 
 
303.609*** 
 
34.193 
 
69.063 
  
(96.650) 
 
(97.422) 
 
(98.227) 
 
(98.998) 
age 
 
248.058*** 
 
229.438*** 
 
407.314*** 
 
378.620*** 
  
(41.831) 
 
(45.581) 
 
(43.768) 
 
(46.992) 
sex 
 
-1,194.403 
 
-2,307.770* 
 
1,413.509 
 
646.521 
  
(1,232.884) 
 
(1,229.199) 
 
(1,334.569) 
 
(1,314.954) 
edu 
 
433.849 
 
638.133** 
 
286.912 
 
388.069 
  
(280.877) 
 
(282.669) 
 
(288.179) 
 
(288.497) 
iqscore 
  
-444.369** -96.502 
  
-901.119*** -299.379 
   
(184.970) (198.981) 
  
(194.669) (199.966) 
Constant 60,054.645*** 32,422.972*** 68,908.885*** 38,789.081*** 49,649.256*** 32,301.411*** 60,485.627*** 38,363.565*** 
 
(973.476) (7,076.057) (1,812.045) (7,465.509) (1,093.606) (7,731.018) (1,962.375) (7,961.889) 
         Observations 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 981 981 981 981 
R-squared 0.023 0.066 0.004 0.049 0.008 0.109 0.021 0.105 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the decision making gamble 
covering loss aversion (losses possible). Data from iLEE1 (1-4) and iLEE2 (5-8). Equivalent to table 13 in 
section 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25 
Regressions of decision time for public good and dictator games 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES CR PG CR PG IQ PG IQ PG CR D CR D IQ D IQ D 
         crscore -412.874* -228.876 
  
-550.237 -142.557 
  
 
(214.852) (216.246) 
  
(438.165) (453.537) 
  
big5a 
 
73.371 
 
75.910* 
 
88.162 
 
86.218 
  
(44.765) 
 
(44.715) 
 
(84.438) 
 
(84.127) 
big5c 
 
55.821 
 
60.685 
 
-2.311 
 
6.245 
  
(46.727) 
 
(46.838) 
 
(88.458) 
 
(87.712) 
big5e 
 
-1.441 
 
1.739 
 
1.792 
 
17.455 
  
(43.774) 
 
(43.180) 
 
(78.707) 
 
(77.934) 
big5n 
 
46.791 
 
48.118 
 
-26.367 
 
-15.046 
  
(41.464) 
 
(41.347) 
 
(79.532) 
 
(79.031) 
big5o 
 
-26.754 
 
-23.744 
 
-102.615 
 
-101.084 
  
(39.884) 
 
(39.906) 
 
(74.365) 
 
(74.142) 
age 
 
156.590*** 
 
133.874*** 
 
206.714*** 
 
172.784*** 
  
(17.920) 
 
(18.987) 
 
(32.548) 
 
(34.313) 
sex 
 
189.669 
 
242.706 
 
1,110.016 
 
1,050.765 
  
(499.958) 
 
(488.853) 
 
(1,017.612) 
 
(980.795) 
edu 
 
-341.226*** 
 
-319.600*** 
 
-821.591*** 
 
-770.023*** 
  
(108.416) 
 
(107.437) 
 
(213.780) 
 
(213.377) 
hypo 
 
242.750 
 
385.839 
    
  
(950.188) 
 
(946.136) 
    
take 
 
-254.728 
 
-266.473 
    
  
(506.744) 
 
(505.173) 
    
iqscore 
  
-520.046*** -267.644*** 
  
-780.625*** -407.789*** 
   
(74.123) (76.899) 
  
(148.271) (152.055) 
Constant 24,614.755*** 15,145.050*** 28,617.988*** 17,592.921*** 32,968.476*** 28,064.218*** 39,147.444*** 31,818.944*** 
 
(389.219) (3,058.807) (704.529) (3,091.396) (781.755) (5,689.810) (1,437.579) (5,827.088) 
         Observations 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 
R-squared 0.002 0.064 0.028 0.069 0.001 0.054 0.025 0.060 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the public good (1-4) and dictator 
games (5-8). Equivalent to table 14 in section 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 2 
This section documents the sensitivity analysis of the cut point in the time variables. 
Every regression in this section will include three different points in the time variable, where 
the middle (marked in grey) represents the cut point we chose. The other points will then 
work as a control, to verify that the cut point we chose, does not affect the results 
dramatically. 
 
Table 26 
Regressions of decision time for risk aversion gamble in iLEE1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
75,000 
CR 
75,000 
CR 
75,000 
IQ 
75,000 
IQ 
100,000 100,000 
CR 
100,000 
IQ 
100,000 
IQ 
125,000 
CR 
125,000 
CR 
125,000 
IQ 
125,000 
IQ CR 
             crscore 1,114.475*** 1,103.564***   1,902.993*** 1,975.814***   2,686.797*** 2,919.063***   
 
(388.091) (391.345)   (511.641) (507.047)   (607.894) (594.169)   
big5a  292.140***  298.083***  295.152***  304.009***  317.088***  323.459*** 
 
 (76.437)  (76.640)  (98.449)  (99.673)  (112.683)  (114.922) 
big5c  140.223  142.562  149.363  160.616  112.176  124.167 
 
 (87.735)  (88.542)  (111.743)  (112.516)  (128.041)  (129.010) 
big5e  -53.821  -70.406  -201.687**  -233.402**  -240.373**  -275.863** 
 
 (76.762)  (77.195)  (100.803)  (100.763)  (118.950)  (119.208) 
big5n  89.029  70.558  -74.455  -108.567  -67.949  -106.602 
 
 (78.589)  (78.257)  (98.367)  (98.258)  (113.445)  (112.422) 
big5o  227.833***  247.154***  276.921***  307.591***  168.075  200.075* 
 
 (74.097)  (74.659)  (93.277)  (93.975)  (113.935)  (114.223) 
young  -5,060.721***  -4,720.436***  -9,012.108***  -7,982.205***  -
12,310.554*** 
 -
11,047.501*** 
 
 (1,298.648)  (1,363.877)  (1,678.986)  (1,779.012)  (1,885.544)  (1,998.444) 
youngmiddle  -2,681.345**  -2,431.601**  -6,910.657***  -6,352.171***  -8,659.947***  -8,116.008*** 
 
 (1,064.282)  (1,089.169)  (1,381.032)  (1,402.911)  (1,640.475)  (1,667.391) 
old  5,514.768***  5,361.599***  5,436.038***  4,730.835**  7,181.101***  6,439.241*** 
 
 (1,496.263)  (1,500.670)  (1,889.010)  (1,868.949)  (2,238.124)  (2,254.764) 
sex  -650.781  -1,195.058  400.566  -446.753  2,636.423*  1,490.243 
 
 (984.182)  (960.224)  (1,230.874)  (1,209.723)  (1,437.188)  (1,429.777) 
highschool  35.747  74.680  77.567  202.566  -38.602  548.512 
 
 (1,686.119)  (1,730.807)  (2,139.704)  (2,169.100)  (2,462.482)  (2,463.426) 
shortuni  -1,242.099  -1,230.962  529.019  700.669  1,282.597  1,991.336 
 
 (1,648.462)  (1,694.136)  (2,147.781)  (2,176.661)  (2,475.438)  (2,473.047) 
longuni  -2,258.941  -1,752.984  -2,010.363  -938.310  -612.549  1,216.523 
 
 (1,848.152)  (1,880.910)  (2,386.125)  (2,402.794)  (2,741.656)  (2,728.836) 
iqscore   -336.210** -152.486   -838.762*** -397.470**   -1,107.927*** -437.599* 
 
  (144.826) (145.350)   (189.855) (192.835)   (219.763) (224.566) 
Constant 49,411.468*** 32,496.506*** 54,330.698*** 35,698.361*** 55,960.947*** 45,635.246*** 66,809.166*** 52,330.875*** 59,399.887*** 52,560.985*** 73,987.563*** 60,986.267*** 
 
(746.022) (5,190.696) (1,457.741) (5,335.271) (974.805) (6,803.715) (1,902.287) (7,057.213) (1,144.844) (7,869.056) (2,199.681) (8,120.202) 
             Observations 831 831 831 831 1,072 1,072 1,072 1,072 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 
R-squared 0.010 0.101 0.007 0.094 0.013 0.117 0.019 0.108 0.016 0.125 0.021 0.111 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the decision making gamble 
covering risk aversion (no losses possible). This corresponds to the cut point (100,000) made for the risk 
aversion gamble for iLEE1, and thus the results from table 12 (regression 1-4). The grey area represents the 
regressions presented in section 5 of this paper, and thus, corresponds to the results we have reported. 515 
observations were cut. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 27 
Regressions of decision time for risk aversion gamble in iLEE2 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
75,000 
CR 
75,000 
CR 
75,000 
IQ 
75,000 
IQ 
100,000 100,000 
CR 
100,000 
IQ 
100,000 
IQ 
125,000 
CR 
125,000 
CR 
125,000 
IQ 
125,000 
IQ CR 
             crscore 662.364 864.404* 
  
541.730 637.644 
  
256.690 64.498 
  
 
(486.064) (471.263) 
  
(621.805) (604.525) 
  
(738.401) (704.892) 
  
big5a 
 
178.193* 
 
163.315* 
 
217.138* 
 
208.229* 
 
143.814 
 
129.481 
  
(92.564) 
 
(91.968) 
 
(117.198) 
 
(116.052) 
 
(148.048) 
 
(146.772) 
big5c 
 
67.661 
 
78.506 
 
28.677 
 
38.977 
 
47.824 
 
67.588 
  
(103.475) 
 
(103.432) 
 
(132.449) 
 
(131.490) 
 
(158.629) 
 
(155.476) 
big5e 
 
67.118 
 
80.132 
 
-79.724 
 
-61.022 
 
-148.124 
 
-114.678 
  
(95.832) 
 
(94.605) 
 
(127.766) 
 
(127.478) 
 
(149.994) 
 
(148.843) 
big5n 
 
88.366 
 
95.089 
 
125.411 
 
139.818 
 
114.166 
 
141.481 
  
(81.752) 
 
(82.028) 
 
(102.019) 
 
(101.562) 
 
(122.559) 
 
(121.106) 
big5o 
 
-103.100 
 
-100.148 
 
20.616 
 
27.108 
 
193.352 
 
196.496 
  
(90.458) 
 
(91.295) 
 
(109.452) 
 
(110.184) 
 
(124.517) 
 
(124.834) 
young 
 
-7,851.945*** 
 
-7,093.481*** 
 
-
12,364.847***  
-
11,297.053***  
-
14,089.769***  
-
12,566.845*** 
  
(1,376.819) 
 
(1,402.977) 
 
(1,755.823) 
 
(1,785.017) 
 
(2,047.269) 
 
(2,062.935) 
youngmiddle 
 
-4,711.810*** 
 
-4,137.270*** 
 
-7,807.441*** 
 
-7,005.954*** 
 
-8,900.441*** 
 
-7,808.043*** 
  
(1,282.774) 
 
(1,304.807) 
 
(1,604.888) 
 
(1,605.835) 
 
(1,937.649) 
 
(1,940.565) 
old 
 
6,016.328*** 
 
5,897.714*** 
 
12,040.209*** 
 
11,802.227*** 
 
13,024.383*** 
 
12,539.284*** 
  
(1,840.834) 
 
(1,825.315) 
 
(2,331.913) 
 
(2,331.020) 
 
(2,661.454) 
 
(2,649.618) 
sex 
 
579.548 
 
100.705 
 
-123.303 
 
-621.630 
 
-1,074.598 
 
-1,430.698 
  
(1,098.411) 
 
(1,087.442) 
 
(1,397.776) 
 
(1,368.866) 
 
(1,644.250) 
 
(1,627.892) 
highschool 
 
2,429.381 
 
2,175.173 
 
1,750.789 
 
1,510.618 
 
2,251.272 
 
1,956.736 
  
(1,857.428) 
 
(1,881.413) 
 
(2,430.056) 
 
(2,441.693) 
 
(2,838.650) 
 
(2,819.097) 
shortuni 
 
3,045.090* 
 
3,043.495* 
 
2,500.110 
 
2,444.551 
 
4,118.834 
 
4,070.721 
  
(1,799.172) 
 
(1,819.494) 
 
(2,367.473) 
 
(2,374.459) 
 
(2,745.310) 
 
(2,729.979) 
longuni 
 
2,015.487 
 
2,243.868 
 
1,481.913 
 
1,619.568 
 
2,929.280 
 
2,874.931 
  
(2,033.823) 
 
(2,028.467) 
 
(2,665.705) 
 
(2,641.476) 
 
(3,108.579) 
 
(3,071.558) 
iqscore 
  
-716.820*** -378.755** 
  
-1,236.110*** -539.247** 
  
-1,574.467*** -782.084*** 
   
(177.252) (181.772) 
  
(224.333) (221.059) 
  
(268.377) (263.360) 
Constant 47,392.256*** 38,795.019*** 55,509.324*** 43,295.295*** 53,689.597*** 47,549.543*** 66,478.516*** 52,518.145*** 57,697.319*** 51,035.860*** 73,158.443*** 56,409.734*** 
 
(942.164) (6,718.221) (1,801.067) (6,830.242) (1,235.243) (8,299.851) (2,313.571) (8,300.085) (1,491.408) (9,855.536) (2,777.803) (9,953.725) 
             Observations 618 618 618 618 738 738 738 738 787 787 787 787 
R-squared 0.003 0.115 0.028 0.118 0.001 0.175 0.041 0.180 0.000 0.154 0.044 0.163 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the decision making gamble 
covering risk aversion (no losses possible). This corresponds to the cut point (100,000) made for the risk 
aversion gamble for iLEE2, and thus the results from table 12 (regression 5-8). The grey area represents the 
regressions presented in section 5 of this paper, and thus, corresponds to the results we have reported. 193 
observations were cut. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 28 
Regressions of decision time for loss aversion gamble in iLEE1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 100,000CR 100,000CR 
100,000 
IQ 
100,000 
IQ 
120,000 120,000 
CR 
120,000 
IQ 
120,000 
IQ 
140,000 
CR 
140,000 
CR 
140,000 
IQ 
140,000 
IQ CR 
             crscore 2,449.980*** 2,191.684***   3,083.595*** 2,918.842***   3,350.490*** 3,103.460***   
 
(446.233) (452.076)   (506.836) (518.791)   (572.192) (581.345)   
big5a  145.509  140.256  200.752**  195.587*  189.489  177.965 
 
 (90.709)  (91.974)  (100.950)  (102.799)  (115.585)  (117.648) 
big5c  85.287  76.181  232.667**  221.532*  225.908*  225.627* 
 
 (99.135)  (99.037)  (113.640)  (114.010)  (129.712)  (130.223) 
big5e  -102.701  -124.971  -203.074**  -237.303**  -282.516**  -323.730*** 
 
 (90.473)  (90.990)  (102.995)  (103.587)  (114.620)  (115.730) 
big5n  -30.465  -57.263  -20.530  -59.262  -10.519  -46.611 
 
 (86.473)  (86.924)  (99.267)  (100.206)  (114.037)  (115.086) 
big5o  138.861  170.298**  271.012***  316.617***  370.942***  425.081*** 
 
 (85.251)  (85.663)  (97.238)  (98.180)  (107.789)  (108.682) 
young  -3,898.351***  -3,659.386**  -5,007.527***  -4,581.210**  -6,041.654***  -5,111.876** 
 
 (1,489.013)  (1,554.124)  (1,713.591)  (1,795.512)  (1,914.289)  (1,995.351) 
youngmiddle  -4,046.667***  -4,081.038***  -4,396.224***  -4,375.232***  -5,500.070***  -5,237.014*** 
 
 (1,219.503)  (1,246.247)  (1,391.895)  (1,427.600)  (1,548.392)  (1,580.490) 
old  3,991.053**  3,479.410**  4,720.277***  4,032.086**  6,237.299***  5,447.328*** 
 
 (1,570.760)  (1,571.466)  (1,787.300)  (1,800.096)  (2,024.247)  (2,050.971) 
sex  -1,555.943  -2,352.282**  -1,257.634  -2,283.196*  -1,272.274  -2,408.203* 
 
 (1,079.618)  (1,073.489)  (1,238.609)  (1,239.846)  (1,376.237)  (1,382.457) 
highschool  2,167.246  2,442.689  603.479  814.017  2,223.392  2,462.838 
 
 (1,962.942)  (1,990.996)  (2,251.839)  (2,307.306)  (2,469.086)  (2,531.623) 
shortuni  4,653.510**  5,198.057***  2,346.588  2,914.256  3,093.621  3,747.520 
 
 (1,869.739)  (1,889.610)  (2,141.206)  (2,188.461)  (2,326.021)  (2,380.756) 
longuni  4,484.259**  5,962.872***  1,768.573  3,463.729  2,943.458  4,832.487* 
 
 (2,201.292)  (2,203.928)  (2,493.944)  (2,505.698)  (2,742.398)  (2,758.518) 
iqscore   -339.319** -47.912   -444.369** -100.169   -717.151*** -286.130 
 
  (158.464) (165.636)   (184.970) (196.543)   (206.821) (217.078) 
Constant 56,742.628*** 48,420.759*** 63,606.088*** 52,868.114*** 60,054.645*** 46,223.673*** 68,908.885*** 52,655.113*** 62,637.533*** 48,312.589*** 74,390.788*** 56,331.315*** 
 
(865.151) (6,317.710) (1,564.561) (6,439.690) (973.476) (7,140.969) (1,812.045) (7,320.002) (1,097.908) (8,011.669) (2,045.125) (8,237.073) 
             Observations 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 
R-squared 0.021 0.064 0.003 0.048 0.023 0.066 0.004 0.047 0.020 0.068 0.007 0.053 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the decision making gamble 
covering loss aversion (losses possible). This corresponds to the cut point (120,000) made for the loss aversion 
gamble for iLEE1, and thus the results from table 13 (regression 1-4). The grey area represents the regressions 
presented in section 5 of this paper, and thus, corresponds to the results we have reported. 270 observations 
were cut.  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 29 
Regressions of decision time for loss aversion gamble in iLEE2 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
75,000 
CR 
75,000 
CR 
75,000 
IQ 
75,000 
IQ 
100,000 100,000 
CR 
100,000 
IQ 
100,000 
IQ 
125,000 
CR 
125,000 
CR 
125,000 
IQ 
125,000 
IQ CR 
             crscore 1,532.605*** 1,505.596*** 
  
1,642.158*** 1,618.350*** 
  
2,624.796*** 2,488.187*** 
  
 
(448.770) (453.713) 
  
(575.070) (573.233) 
  
(699.430) (693.650) 
  
big5a 
 
-46.345 
 
-62.850 
 
-94.068 
 
-114.395 
 
-36.302 
 
-74.225 
  
(92.939) 
 
(93.811) 
 
(118.952) 
 
(119.294) 
 
(141.493) 
 
(142.296) 
big5c 
 
48.804 
 
52.093 
 
134.092 
 
145.829 
 
18.676 
 
39.469 
  
(96.143) 
 
(96.814) 
 
(114.595) 
 
(114.838) 
 
(137.525) 
 
(138.180) 
big5e 
 
-37.265 
 
-62.743 
 
-61.341 
 
-74.192 
 
12.901 
 
-11.015 
  
(90.984) 
 
(91.426) 
 
(107.769) 
 
(107.403) 
 
(128.092) 
 
(128.904) 
big5n 
 
-73.262 
 
-90.264 
 
-202.356* 
 
-216.845** 
 
-286.646** 
 
-303.869** 
  
(88.463) 
 
(88.520) 
 
(104.576) 
 
(105.396) 
 
(121.649) 
 
(122.504) 
big5o 
 
51.447 
 
74.542 
 
62.341 
 
97.190 
 
105.355 
 
160.752 
  
(79.988) 
 
(80.611) 
 
(99.550) 
 
(100.335) 
 
(122.270) 
 
(123.877) 
young 
 
-6,931.371*** 
 
-6,770.457*** 
 
-
10,848.703***  
-
10,059.452***  
-
13,498.653***  
-
11,975.205*** 
  
(1,437.107) 
 
(1,473.349) 
 
(1,715.424) 
 
(1,761.718) 
 
(2,043.428) 
 
(2,082.261) 
youngmiddle 
 
-3,533.644*** 
 
-3,517.678*** 
 
-5,609.881*** 
 
-5,155.708*** 
 
-8,274.550*** 
 
-7,330.304*** 
  
(1,207.476) 
 
(1,228.607) 
 
(1,531.121) 
 
(1,578.632) 
 
(1,802.388) 
 
(1,865.487) 
old 
 
5,418.486*** 
 
5,307.947*** 
 
8,496.478*** 
 
8,088.809*** 
 
10,869.830*** 
 
10,032.418*** 
  
(1,663.871) 
 
(1,686.962) 
 
(1,945.498) 
 
(1,964.062) 
 
(2,316.882) 
 
(2,342.690) 
sex 
 
1,184.893 
 
614.856 
 
1,285.491 
 
543.046 
 
911.738 
 
-206.364 
  
(1,100.708) 
 
(1,093.294) 
 
(1,356.666) 
 
(1,337.609) 
 
(1,602.540) 
 
(1,570.563) 
highschool 
 
2,741.255 
 
2,947.745 
 
4,324.535* 
 
4,482.771* 
 
3,819.966 
 
3,987.657 
  
(1,855.518) 
 
(1,858.831) 
 
(2,300.814) 
 
(2,321.957) 
 
(2,675.119) 
 
(2,709.004) 
shortuni 
 
2,525.517 
 
2,912.499 
 
4,330.248** 
 
4,714.986** 
 
6,241.123** 
 
6,855.091** 
  
(1,783.300) 
 
(1,787.783) 
 
(2,201.297) 
 
(2,220.441) 
 
(2,634.875) 
 
(2,671.677) 
longuni 
 
3,531.237* 
 
4,136.700** 
 
2,702.848 
 
3,345.879 
 
3,924.718 
 
5,050.762* 
  
(1,984.525) 
 
(1,991.034) 
 
(2,453.822) 
 
(2,470.240) 
 
(2,956.702) 
 
(3,002.865) 
iqscore 
  
-355.051** 8.416 
  
-901.119*** -278.068 
  
-1,416.480*** -575.233** 
   
(164.289) (168.267) 
  
(194.669) (200.942) 
  
(230.140) (237.515) 
Constant 43,337.069*** 43,314.492*** 49,034.055*** 46,373.936*** 49,649.256*** 50,637.910*** 60,485.627*** 55,489.627*** 52,489.600*** 53,593.350*** 69,495.398*** 62,402.831*** 
 
(861.586) (6,352.481) (1,639.353) (6,434.676) (1,093.606) (7,713.083) (1,962.375) (7,719.936) (1,284.523) (9,441.081) (2,343.751) (9,453.634) 
             Observations 817 817 817 817 981 981 981 981 1,061 1,061 1,061 1,061 
R-squared 0.013 0.086 0.006 0.075 0.008 0.116 0.021 0.111 0.013 0.136 0.033 0.129 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the decision making gamble 
covering loss aversion (losses possible). This corresponds to the cut point (100,000) made for the loss aversion 
gamble for iLEE2, and thus the results from table 13 (regression 5-8). The grey area represents the regressions 
presented in section 5 of this paper, and thus, corresponds to the results we have reported. 169 observations 
were cut. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 30 
Regressions of decision time for public good game 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
40,000 
CR 
40,000 
CR 
40,000 
IQ 
40,000 
IQ 
50,000 50,000 
CR 
50,000 
IQ 
50,000 
IQ 
60,000 
CR 
60,000 
CR 
60,000 
IQ 
60,000 
IQ CR 
             crscore -370.982** -135.180 
  
-412.874* -180.636 
  
-610.362** -333.284 
  
 
(176.830) (176.992) 
  
(214.852) (213.302) 
  
(253.254) (250.560) 
  
big5a 
 
110.632*** 
 
113.575*** 
 
95.528** 
 
96.756** 
 
134.752*** 
 
137.044*** 
  
(35.553) 
 
(35.356) 
 
(44.433) 
 
(44.391) 
 
(50.972) 
 
(51.091) 
big5c 
 
46.894 
 
51.160 
 
70.718 
 
75.327 
 
55.212 
 
59.164 
  
(36.707) 
 
(36.851) 
 
(45.888) 
 
(46.107) 
 
(52.892) 
 
(53.046) 
big5e 
 
49.337 
 
51.513 
 
-12.048 
 
-8.624 
 
-56.768 
 
-49.552 
  
(35.115) 
 
(34.697) 
 
(43.607) 
 
(43.047) 
 
(51.907) 
 
(51.568) 
big5n 
 
20.359 
 
22.307 
 
37.004 
 
38.791 
 
35.623 
 
39.256 
  
(33.696) 
 
(33.619) 
 
(40.884) 
 
(40.836) 
 
(48.933) 
 
(48.919) 
big5o 
 
-61.566* 
 
-57.513* 
 
-30.912 
 
-26.902 
 
-22.813 
 
-20.916 
  
(31.990) 
 
(32.090) 
 
(39.465) 
 
(39.512) 
 
(46.230) 
 
(46.305) 
young 
 
-2,217.852*** 
 
-1,835.047*** 
 
-1,685.769** 
 
-1,110.620 
 
-2,277.222*** 
 
-1,669.870* 
  
(580.615) 
 
(598.290) 
 
(710.965) 
 
(725.744) 
 
(860.417) 
 
(879.693) 
youngmiddle 
 
-1,701.929*** 
 
-1,465.456*** 
 
-1,863.786*** 
 
-1,485.010*** 
 
-2,540.262*** 
 
-2,121.245*** 
  
(453.869) 
 
(460.942) 
 
(536.921) 
 
(541.066) 
 
(646.826) 
 
(655.100) 
old 
 
3,819.255*** 
 
3,588.112*** 
 
5,502.063*** 
 
5,145.037*** 
 
6,552.000*** 
 
6,236.743*** 
  
(607.141) 
 
(607.143) 
 
(731.344) 
 
(732.043) 
 
(858.758) 
 
(867.448) 
sex 
 
382.834 
 
396.580 
 
216.807 
 
258.221 
 
454.471 
 
565.445 
  
(416.965) 
 
(408.486) 
 
(500.974) 
 
(489.609) 
 
(600.630) 
 
(592.997) 
highschool 
 
-1,693.403** 
 
-1,720.766** 
 
-1,366.577* 
 
-1,374.897* 
 
-984.051 
 
-994.299 
  
(698.443) 
 
(695.218) 
 
(819.806) 
 
(816.649) 
 
(981.699) 
 
(982.179) 
shortuni 
 
-2,014.391*** 
 
-1,983.839*** 
 
-1,930.742** 
 
-1,869.930** 
 
-2,243.963** 
 
-2,240.172** 
  
(649.596) 
 
(647.501) 
 
(762.616) 
 
(757.210) 
 
(913.798) 
 
(911.864) 
longuni 
 
-2,480.216*** 
 
-2,446.892*** 
 
-1,979.460** 
 
-1,901.913** 
 
-2,291.792** 
 
-2,303.198** 
  
(780.192) 
 
(775.141) 
 
(927.513) 
 
(916.753) 
 
(1,070.282) 
 
(1,059.158) 
hypo 
 
493.707 
 
577.979 
 
331.985 
 
449.628 
 
-865.158 
 
-743.918 
  
(739.775) 
 
(738.290) 
 
(935.633) 
 
(930.840) 
 
(1,050.125) 
 
(1,043.929) 
take 
 
-349.344 
 
-354.524 
 
-345.107 
 
-345.211 
 
-1,184.983** 
 
-1,192.335** 
  
(413.440) 
 
(412.006) 
 
(501.672) 
 
(499.814) 
 
(580.755) 
 
(579.189) 
iqscore 
  
-376.979*** -174.896*** 
  
-520.046*** -260.918*** 
  
-619.448*** -276.345*** 
   
(61.689) (63.222) 
  
(74.123) (75.949) 
  
(87.054) (90.709) 
Constant 22,547.318*** 19,008.551*** 25,374.896*** 19,788.657*** 24,614.755*** 21,045.824*** 28,617.988*** 22,418.426*** 26,745.388*** 23,884.152*** 31,315.448*** 25,046.562*** 
 
(318.406) (2,408.079) (582.071) (2,397.803) (389.219) (2,944.747) (704.529) (2,929.089) (468.198) (3,451.939) (829.664) (3,446.772) 
             Observations 1,583 1,583 1,583 1,583 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 
R-squared 0.003 0.085 0.023 0.089 0.002 0.080 0.028 0.086 0.003 0.089 0.026 0.093 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the public good game. This 
corresponds to the cut point (50,000) made for the public good game, and thus the results from table 14 
(regression 1-4). The grey area represents the regressions presented in section 5 of this paper, and thus, 
corresponds to the results we have reported. 540 observations were cut. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 31 
Regressions of decision time for dictator game 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
50,000 
CR 
50,000 
CR 
50,000 
IQ 
50,000 
IQ 
75,000 75,000 
CR 
75,000 
IQ 
75,000 
IQ 
100,000 
CR 
100,000 
CR 
100,000 
IQ 
100,000 
IQ CR 
             crscore -878.040*** -615.535* 
  
-550.237 -220.054 
  
-529.207 -324.088 
  
 
(316.032) (315.777) 
  
(438.165) (451.475) 
  
(538.569) (540.263) 
  
big5a 
 
-25.197 
 
-24.841 
 
108.884 
 
106.119 
 
204.410** 
 
200.560** 
  
(61.157) 
 
(60.960) 
 
(85.122) 
 
(84.784) 
 
(102.220) 
 
(101.477) 
big5c 
 
131.182** 
 
132.960** 
 
8.535 
 
17.334 
 
115.177 
 
131.438 
  
(65.852) 
 
(65.583) 
 
(88.959) 
 
(88.300) 
 
(103.758) 
 
(102.506) 
big5e 
 
23.363 
 
40.532 
 
-8.498 
 
9.673 
 
-37.703 
 
-13.087 
  
(58.459) 
 
(58.258) 
 
(79.274) 
 
(78.524) 
 
(100.717) 
 
(100.553) 
big5n 
 
72.259 
 
78.710 
 
-41.666 
 
-28.854 
 
40.819 
 
61.681 
  
(57.361) 
 
(57.606) 
 
(79.446) 
 
(78.989) 
 
(105.223) 
 
(104.057) 
big5o 
 
-103.564* 
 
-110.592* 
 
-126.726* 
 
-124.210* 
 
-106.258 
 
-99.549 
  
(56.748) 
 
(56.569) 
 
(75.145) 
 
(74.994) 
 
(94.879) 
 
(95.126) 
young 
 
-3,572.997*** 
 
-3,125.105*** 
 
-2,774.074** 
 
-1,884.929 
 
-2,678.681 
 
-1,322.836 
  
(957.737) 
 
(985.578) 
 
(1,405.634) 
 
(1,419.810) 
 
(1,806.102) 
 
(1,867.710) 
youngmiddle 
 
-2,334.542*** 
 
-1,978.815** 
 
-3,091.653*** 
 
-2,455.643** 
 
-3,615.074** 
 
-2,588.106* 
  
(850.978) 
 
(872.856) 
 
(1,146.047) 
 
(1,155.040) 
 
(1,404.177) 
 
(1,425.439) 
old 
 
3,847.031*** 
 
3,548.250*** 
 
5,820.852*** 
 
5,242.574*** 
 
7,565.183*** 
 
6,588.942*** 
  
(965.183) 
 
(971.926) 
 
(1,309.268) 
 
(1,325.616) 
 
(1,640.591) 
 
(1,655.516) 
sex 
 
923.922 
 
1,115.564 
 
1,133.160 
 
1,113.236 
 
-1,067.481 
 
-1,128.510 
  
(733.372) 
 
(718.421) 
 
(1,013.867) 
 
(979.922) 
 
(1,278.172) 
 
(1,253.173) 
highschool 
 
-2,944.511** 
 
-2,950.207** 
 
-1,612.409 
 
-1,566.091 
 
263.377 
 
291.046 
  
(1,235.484) 
 
(1,230.869) 
 
(1,674.783) 
 
(1,677.726) 
 
(2,019.483) 
 
(2,025.430) 
shortuni 
 
-3,983.326*** 
 
-3,946.658*** 
 
-4,434.066*** 
 
-4,244.447*** 
 
-3,344.513* 
 
-3,144.790 
  
(1,176.888) 
 
(1,177.197) 
 
(1,535.349) 
 
(1,541.321) 
 
(1,905.199) 
 
(1,911.750) 
longuni 
 
-3,344.410** 
 
-3,481.469** 
 
-3,705.367** 
 
-3,574.743* 
 
-1,736.278 
 
-1,544.460 
  
(1,376.432) 
 
(1,365.951) 
 
(1,835.076) 
 
(1,826.827) 
 
(2,288.145) 
 
(2,271.728) 
iqscore 
  
-521.553*** -278.716** 
  
-780.625*** -424.051*** 
  
-1,072.729*** -684.242*** 
   
(106.711) (111.761) 
  
(148.271) (150.375) 
  
(184.075) (198.735) 
Constant 28,392.280*** 28,576.302*** 31,824.759*** 29,444.560*** 32,968.476*** 35,970.189*** 39,147.444*** 38,040.185*** 36,439.551*** 31,188.862*** 45,192.932*** 34,624.982*** 
 
(581.890) (4,216.977) (1,053.792) (4,246.827) (781.755) (5,748.274) (1,437.579) (5,769.486) (972.147) (6,980.813) (1,793.591) (6,953.948) 
             Observations 952 952 952 952 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 
R-squared 0.008 0.079 0.025 0.082 0.001 0.059 0.025 0.065 0.001 0.054 0.029 0.064 
Notes: OLS regression on CR and IQ scores respectively on the time spent on the dictator game. This 
corresponds to the cut point (75,000) made for the dictator game, and thus the results from table 14 (regression 
5-8). The grey area represents the regressions presented in section 5 of this paper, and thus, corresponds to the 
results we have reported. 211 observations were cut. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
80 
 
Appendix 3 
This section holds the corresponding OLS regressions from the probit analysis conducted 
in section 5.2.2. 
 
Table 32 
Regressions of public good game money distribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CR CR IQ IQ 
          
crscore 0.708** 0.412     
  (0.302) (0.308)     
big5a   0.269***   0.269*** 
    (0.065)   (0.065) 
big5c   -0.146**   -0.149** 
    (0.067)   (0.067) 
big5e   0.106*   0.100 
    (0.061)   (0.061) 
big5n   -0.088   -0.093 
    (0.059)   (0.059) 
big5o   0.113*   0.119** 
    (0.058)   (0.058) 
young   -3.222***   -3.279*** 
    (1.065)   (1.096) 
youngmiddle   0.941   0.880 
    (0.791)   (0.805) 
old   -0.881   -0.912 
    (0.945)   (0.963) 
sex   -1.351*   -1.500** 
    (0.715)   (0.706) 
highschool   2.208*   2.235* 
    (1.228)   (1.230) 
shortuni   2.006*   2.080* 
    (1.144)   (1.146) 
longuni   3.362**   3.580*** 
    (1.355)   (1.352) 
hypo   -6.721***   -6.760*** 
    (1.408)   (1.412) 
take   0.456   0.467 
    (0.757)   (0.757) 
iqscore     0.045 0.036 
      (0.102) (0.111) 
Constant 33.685*** 24.801*** 34.338*** 25.350*** 
  (0.543) (4.166) (0.945) (4.209) 
          
Observations 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 
R-squared 0.002 0.040 0.000 0.040 
Notes: OLS regression with CR and IQ score respectively on the share of money (DKK) given (or taken) to 
(from) the common pot in the public good game.  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 33 
Regressions of dictator game money distribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CR CR IQ IQ 
          
crscore 4.193*** 3.717***     
  (0.819) (0.824)     
big5a   -0.566***   -0.562*** 
    (0.173)   (0.174) 
big5c   0.091   0.068 
    (0.177)   (0.178) 
big5e   0.286*   0.202 
    (0.167)   (0.165) 
big5n   -0.045   -0.091 
    (0.157)   (0.155) 
big5o   -0.521***   -0.479*** 
    (0.149)   (0.148) 
young   10.893***   8.962*** 
    (2.878)   (2.936) 
youngmiddle   4.795**   3.253 
    (2.300)   (2.345) 
old   -3.499   -2.528 
    (2.226)   (2.249) 
sex   -0.543   -1.967 
    (1.982)   (1.976) 
highschool   2.576   2.856 
    (3.320)   (3.314) 
shortuni   3.171   3.555 
    (3.104)   (3.092) 
longuni   9.195**   10.608*** 
    (3.703)   (3.677) 
iqscore     1.582*** 1.051*** 
      (0.266) (0.283) 
Constant 92.856*** 109.302*** 85.256*** 109.263*** 
  (1.398) (11.508) (2.308) (11.515) 
          
Observations 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 
R-squared 0.020 0.071 0.024 0.065 
Notes: OLS regression with CR and IQ score respectively on the share of money (DKK) taken to keep in the 
dictator game. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
